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THE FEDERAL OPTION: DELAWARE AS A DE FACTO 
AGENCY 
Omari Scott Simmons* 
Abstract: Despite over 200 years of deliberation and debate, the United States has not 
adopted a federal corporate chartering law. Instead, Delaware is the “Federal Option” for 
corporate law and adjudication. The contemporary federal corporate chartering debate is, in 
part, a referendum on its role. Although the federal government has regulated other aspects of 
interstate commerce and has the power to charter corporations and preempt Delaware pursuant 
to its Commerce Clause power, it has not done so. Despite the rich and robust scholarly 
discussion of Delaware’s jurisdictional dominance, its role as a de facto national regulator 
remains underdeveloped. This Article addresses a vexing question: Can Delaware, a haven for 
incorporation and adjudication, serve as an effective national regulator? Following an analysis 
of federal chartering alternatives, such as the Nader Plan, the Warren Plan, the Sanders Plan, 
and other modes of regulation, the answer is yes, but with some caveats and qualifications. 
Delaware’s adequate, if imperfect, performance as a surrogate national regulator of corporate 
internal affairs argues against the upheaval of the existing corporate law framework federal 
chartering would bring. Even in the contemporary moment where longstanding concerns about 
corporate power, purpose, accountability, and the uneasy relationship between corporations 
and society are amplified, Delaware can continue to perform an important agency-like role in 
collaboration with federal regulators and regulated firms. A deeper examination comparing the 
merits of federal corporate chartering with Delaware’s de facto agency function illuminates 
the potential of existing and future reforms. This Article concludes that federal chartering 
proposals have an important impact despite not being adopted for centuries. First, federal 
chartering proposals encourage policymakers to look beyond the status quo toward greater 
hybridization in regulatory design. Second, elements of previous federal chartering proposals 
have historically become successful “à la carte” reforms or part of other successful reform 
measures. Third, federal chartering proposals provide value as a bargaining tool where the 
threat of more intrusive federal regulation makes other reform methods more palatable to 
diverse corporate constituencies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite over 200 years of deliberation and debate, the United States 
has not adopted a federal corporate chartering law. Delaware is the 
“Federal Option”1 for corporate law and adjudication, and the 
contemporary federal chartering debate is, in part, a referendum on 
Delaware’s role. Although the federal government has regulated other 
aspects of interstate commerce and has the power to charter corporations 
and preempt Delaware, pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, it has not 
done so. Despite the rich and robust scholarly discussion of Delaware’s 
jurisdictional dominance, its role as a de facto national regulator remains 
underdeveloped.2 This Article addresses a vexing question: Can 
Delaware, a haven for incorporation and adjudication, serve as an 
effective national regulator? Following an analysis of alternatives, 
including the Nader Group Report of 1976,3 the Accountable Capitalism 
Act of 2018 (the “Warren Plan”),4 and the Corporate Accountability and 
Democracy Plan (the “Sanders Plan”),5 the answer is yes, but with some 
caveats and qualifications. Delaware’s adequate, if imperfect, 
performance as a surrogate national regulator of corporate internal affairs 
argues against the upheaval of the existing corporate law framework 
federal chartering would bring—even in the face of longstanding concerns 
about corporate power, purpose, and accountability. A deeper 
examination comparing the merits of federal corporate chartering with 
Delaware’s de facto agency function illuminates the potential of existing 
and future reforms.6 
 
1. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering 
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 605 (2002). 
2. Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1435, 1467 (2008); William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 570, 586 (2012); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and 
Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 683–84 (2005); Marcel 
Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1573, 1612 (2005); Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 221 (2015). 
3. RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: 
THE CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976). 
4. S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). 
5. Corporate Accountability and Democracy, BERNIE SANDERS, 
https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/ER76-
GYSL?type=image]. 
6. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, MORTON MINTZ, COLMAN MCCARTHY, SANFORD J. UNGAR, KERMIT 
VANDIVIER, SAUL FRIEDMAN & JAMES BOYD, IN THE NAME OF PROFIT 264 (1972) (“[L]ittle is gained 
when we delude ourselves as to the ease with which human society can be restructured. The cause of 
reform, not to mention that of constructive revolution, is too important to be nurtured on anything but 
the truth.”); Donald E. Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 
71, 88 (1972).  
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Common and convenient arguments against federal chartering include: 
(1) the political opposition argument; that is, federal chartering is 
impractical given the inevitable pushback from powerful interest groups, 
such as corporate managers;7 (2) the economic argument; that is, 
unintended costs and consequences will likely outweigh benefits;8 and 
(3) status quo sufficiency arguments; that is, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix 
it.”9 While these responses are relevant, a deeper consideration of the 
merits of federal corporate chartering in the contemporary context is 
warranted. 
Historically and today, the driving force behind federal chartering 
proposals has been concern about both corporate power and making large 
corporations, particularly management, more accountable to shareholder 
and stakeholder interests.10 Proponents view the abuse of corporate power 
as a meta-problem, requiring a deep structural, federal-charter-based 
remedy.11 Even putting aside the potential implementation challenges of 
federal chartering, substantive federal reforms have been and can be 
achieved without it. Federal chartering is simply one method along a 
continuum, which includes: (1) federal licensing; (2) a comprehensive 
federal corporate code; (3) incremental federal corporate regulation;12 
(4) external federal stakeholder regulation;13 (5) state social enterprise 
 
7. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1499–508 (1992); William L. Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974); Jonathan 
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 
TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987). 
8. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 709, 720–25 (1987) (arguing that Delaware’s success in the chartering market results from 
Delaware’s superior ability to minimize transaction costs); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some 
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 225, 281 (1985) (arguing that national 
corporate chartering would impose a welfare loss on shareholders because the federal government 
cannot offer transaction-specific assets as hostages to safeguard the investments of firms). 
9. For example, a recent publication authored by Marcel Kahan uses the status quo sufficiency 
argument by asserting “Delaware law works at least tolerably well, so why take a chance and replace 
it with some unknown federal rules.” Marcel Kahan, The State of State Competition for 
Incorporations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 105, 127 
(Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).  
10. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933); NADER ET AL., supra note 3. 
11. See infra Part II. 
12. Examples include federal reforms that affect internal corporate affairs such as executive 
compensation, auditing, board composition, and board committees. See infra Part V. 
13. Examples include federal regulatory statutes that address stakeholder concerns outside the 
corporate law context, such as labor, antitrust, banking, and environmental law. See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–
78mm). For the 1933 Act, see Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
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statutes; (6) market forces; and (7) self-regulation.14 In the absence of 
federal chartering, these other reform methods can be combined and 
configured in multiple ways to creatively address manager, shareholder, 
and broader stakeholder interests. They are also more politically feasible 
than a federal corporate chartering regime. 
Part I of the Article discusses Delaware’s function as a de facto agency, 
focusing on its unique institutional dynamics and relationship to federal 
regulators. Part II analyzes the longstanding federal chartering debate 
from several perspectives: historical, academic, political, economic, and 
interest-group dynamics. Part III examines three contemporary federal 
chartering proposals: the Nader Group Report of 1976; the Accountable 
Capitalism Act of 2018 (the “Warren Plan”)15; and the Corporate 
Accountability and Democracy Plan (the “Sanders Plan”).16 
Part IV explores the possible efficacy of a future federal chartering 
regime. First, it describes implementation challenges, the politicization of 
internal corporate affairs, and the adversarial versus cooperative 
relationship a federal chartering regime envisions between the federal 
government and state law regimes like Delaware. Next, it points to other 
barriers in the contemporary context: the rise of impact investing, 
evolving expectations for corporate managers, risk of capital migration, 
and political considerations. Finally, despite its position that federal 
chartering is not suited to the contemporary context, it identifies three 
scenarios where, in theory, federal chartering may be warranted: (1) if 
state benefit-corporation statutes become a blueprint (i.e., state laboratory 
argument); (2) if companies adopt federal charters as a condition of 
receiving a federal bailout or other significant government support; and 
(3) if companies adopt a federal charter as a mechanism to receive 
amnesty from severe penalties and sanctions. 
Part V explores alternatives to federal chartering: federal licensing, a 
comprehensive federal corporate code, incremental federal corporate 
legislation, external federal stakeholder regulation, state social enterprise 
statutes, market forces, and self-regulation. It predicts that contemporary 
federal chartering proposals or an expansive federal corporate code will 
not be adopted. Nevertheless, the mere threat of their adoption may 
influence negotiation and compromise, bringing regulators, corporate 
 
§§ 77a-77aa); National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69); Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53). 
14. See L. E. Birdzell, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Corporation: The Case for the Federal 
Chartering of Giant Corporations, 32 BUS. LAW. 317, 318 (1976). 
15. S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). 
16. See Corporate Accountability and Democracy, supra note 5. 
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managers, and other constituencies to coalesce around less intrusive forms 
of regulation as alternatives. Hence, the more likely regulatory responses 
are incremental encroachment on Delaware law and more robust external 
federal stakeholder regulation. Self-regulation (e.g., environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) initiatives) will also play a prominent role 
and mollify public fervor for more intrusive federal regulation. 
Part VI illustrates the implications of the contemporary federal 
chartering debate. Despite dim prospects of adoption, the federal 
chartering debate prompts a more robust discussion of alternatives and 
possibilities beyond the status quo. Delaware’s effectiveness as a de facto 
agency, coupled with other available forms of corporate regulation, 
renders contemporary proposals for mandatory or even voluntary federal 
chartering premature and superfluous. Nevertheless, contemporary 
federal chartering proposals reflect a longstanding tension between the 
exercise of corporate power and broader stakeholder concerns. This 
tension underlies the important trend of hybridization in regulatory design 
as well as corporate practice to accommodate the interests of multiple 
corporate constituencies with diverse motives.17 The contemporary ESG 
focus and proliferation of social enterprise statutes are an outgrowth of 
this trend toward hybridization. The emergent ESG landscape is 
pressuring federal, state, and firm self-regulatory regimes to 
accommodate broader stakeholder concerns. Despite not being adopted 
for centuries, federal chartering proposals have an important impact in the 
contemporary context. First, federal chartering proposals encourage 
policymakers to look beyond the status quo toward greater hybridization 
in regulatory design. Second, elements of previous federal chartering 
proposals have historically become successful “à la carte” reforms or part 
of other successful reform measures. Third, federal chartering proposals 
provide value as a bargaining tool where the threat of more intrusive 
federal regulation makes other reform methods more palatable to diverse 
corporate constituencies. 
I. DELAWARE AS A DE FACTO AGENCY 
Delaware’s dominance as a premier jurisdiction for corporate 
chartering and adjudication is well established. Over 60% of U.S. publicly 
traded corporations are incorporated in Delaware, making it the nation’s 
 
17. See, e.g., Omari Scott Simmons, Judging the Public Benefit Corporation, in 20 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 354, 354–55 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. 
Yockey eds., 2018) (illustrating how ESG and public benefit corporations reflect this hybridization 
trend). 
Simmons (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:01 PM 
2021] THE FEDERAL OPTION 941 
 
corporate capital.18 Consequently, “[t]he aggregated choices of a majority 
of publicly traded U.S. corporations have resulted in a convergence on the 
[Delaware General Corporation Law and Delaware common law 
precedents] as a de facto national corporate law.”19 Moreover, “[f]or at 
least half a century the Delaware courts have been the de facto ‘national’ 
U.S. corporate law courts.”20 
A. Corporate Lawmakers 
Lawmakers supply the service of law and regulation to corporate 
constituents. Law is created in different ways—through the legislative 
process, the judicial process, and adoption of norms and customs—each 
having its own challenges.21 In the corporate governance context, law and 
regulation suppliers are not monolithic and may have separate agendas.22 
The primary suppliers are Delaware (primarily Delaware state courts and 
 
18. See Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG 
(Aug. 3, 2015), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/08/03/the-delaware-delusion/ [https://per 
ma.cc/TWE3-XNAK] (discussing Delaware’s dominance in the corporate law market).  
19. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 
AM. J. COMPAR. L. 329, 331 (2001) (discussing distribution of shareholding within a country). “The 
aggregated choices of a majority of publicly traded U.S. corporations have resulted in a convergence 
on the [DGCL] as a de facto national corporate law.” Id. at 350. See generally Brian Broughman, 
Jesse M. Fried & Darian Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence, 57 J.L. & 
ECON. 865 (2014).  
20. John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 
1345, 1398 (2012). Armour, Cheffins, and Black comment on the ubiquitous nature of Delaware law:  
Delaware law is a central part of the business law curriculum in most major U.S. law schools. 
The official comments accompanying the Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA), a model 
law followed by twenty-four states, frequently refer to Delaware cases to provide examples to 
explain the drafters’ choices. Courts in other states often cite and follow Delaware case law when 
their own case law is sparse. Courts in MBCA states sometimes cite Delaware jurisprudence in 
preference to decisions from other MBCA states. 
Id. at 1398–99. William T. Allen, former Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery, describes 
Delaware’s preeminence: 
My speculation is that the entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that choose Delaware have it 
right. The IPO market and the secondary market trust the system of the Delaware corporation 
law to be systematically fair. That, of course, doesn’t mean that all market participants will 
approve each element of the system—or each court ruling or statutory amendment. Any 
particular decision may generate disagreement, disapproval or dissent, but year upon year the 
system taken as a whole plausibly balances deference to management’s need for broad discretion 
in deploying the firm’s capital with protection of shareholder basic interest . . . . In doing so, 
Delaware law provides an outstanding public service to the nation. 
William T. Allen, Whence the Value-Added in Delaware Incorporation?, CORP. EDGE (Div. of 
Corps., Dover, Del.), Fall 1997, at 3 (on file with author). The Corporate Edge was a quarterly 
newsletter published by the Delaware Department of State’s Division of Corporations. The newsletter 
went out of print in 2001. 
21. See generally Francesco Parisi, Sources of Law and the Institutional Design of Lawmaking, 19 
J. PUB. FIN. & PUB. CHOICE 95 (2001). 
22. Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive 
Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 323 (2009). 
Simmons (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:01 PM 
942 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:935 
 
its General Assembly) and the federal government (primarily the 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) and Congress). Additional 
suppliers of corporate regulation include other government agencies, such 
as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs), such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD).23 
This Article focuses on two lawmaking bodies—Delaware and the 
federal government. Traditionally, Delaware law has governed corporate 
internal affairs, while the SEC has addressed external issues of securities 
trading and disclosure. Their interaction and separate spheres of influence 
often “determine whose interests and which ideas dominate American 
corporate law.”24 Note that “[t]he dominant ideas and interests in 
Delaware [may] differ from those in Washington.”25 The list of suppliers 
or lawmakers noted above reflects the scope of traditional corporate law 
and does not address the entire matrix of business regulation.26 There is 
an important distinction between traditional corporate law and laws 
affecting corporations, which include other types of regulation, such as 
labor, antitrust, and environmental laws.27 
B. Delaware’s Institutional Dynamics 
Unique institutional features bolster Delaware’s de facto agency role. 
Its judiciary—that is, the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware 
Supreme Court—is the primary corporate lawmaking body; its General 
Assembly plays a secondary role.28 In addition, institutional alignment 
 
23. The SEC is accountable to Congress, and SROs are indirectly controlled by the SEC. Mark J. 
Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 598–600 (2003). SRO rules are subject to 
approval by the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1). 
24. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2494 (2005). 
25. Id. 
26. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 30–32 (1986) (distinguishing between 
traditional corporate law and other laws affecting corporations). Examples of other laws affecting 
corporations include other types of regulation, such as environmental, labor, health, and safety 
regulations. Id.  
27. Id.  
28. Former Governors of Delaware succinctly explained Delaware courts’ lawmaking role: 
Delaware’s judiciary is a crown jewel of the State. Delaware’s courts, and in particular its Court 
of Chancery, enjoy a reputation of excellence in the nation and around the world. The Court of 
Chancery’s expertise in corporate law is recognized as preeminent in the nation, having been 
developed over the course of “thousands of opinions interpreting virtually every provision of 
Delaware’s corporate law. 
Brief for Former Governors of the State of Delaware as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, 
Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020) (No. 19-309) [hereinafter Brief for Former 
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among key state actors and a stable political climate contribute to its 
competitive advantage.29 For example, the relationship between the 
Delaware corporate bar, the General Assembly, the Division of 
Corporations, and the judiciary is collaborative.30 Influential groups, such 
as the state judiciary and the local bar, maintain a robust “collegial 
interaction,” and the General Assembly pays deference to the corporate 
bar.31 Few legislative pressures disrupt the development of law, and 
stakeholder groups––unions, environmental groups, and local 
communities––exercise little pressure.32 
Delaware is often criticized for what observers call a pro-management 
bias, reflected in its law.33 However, appointed judges in its “plaintiff-
driven system are not as sensitive to interest-group pressures.”34 For 
example, Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery judicial 
officers are selected by a bipartisan judicial nominating commission and 
are ultimately appointed by Delaware’s Governor for twelve-year terms.35 
 
Governors of Delaware] (citation omitted) (quoting William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. L. 351, 
354 (1992)). 
29. Brief for Former Governors Delaware, supra note 28, at 9–10 (“The consistency that Delaware 
furnishes in pronouncing the de facto corporate law of the United States has been a significant benefit 
to American businesses seeking capital in the domestic and international markets.” (citing Simmons, 
supra note 2, at 239 (“Delaware corporate law functions as a common language or lingua franca 
among domestic and foreign firms, investors, bankers, and legal advisors.”))). 
30. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1940 (1998); see also Simmons, supra note 22, at 324–25; E. Norman Veasey, 
“I Have the Best Job in America,” 13 DEL. LAW. 21, 23 (1995) (asserting that the Delaware Supreme 
Court has “excellent relations with the other two branches of state government”). E. Norman Veasey, 
the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, commented on Delaware’s cooperative 
atmosphere:  
Delaware’s size as the “small wonder” gives us an enormous advantage, particularly when 
coupled with the intelligence, approachability, cooperation and integrity of our public office 
holders. All three branches of government in Delaware are keenly aware of the reputation of the 
judicial branch of government and of the enormous contribution that the judicial branch makes 
to Delaware’s economy and to the well-being of our citizens. Delaware’s judicial branch must, 
however, continuously explain and justify its processes to the other two branches and to the 
citizenry. We are making that effort. But, we need the help of the organized Bar, and we need 
for the other two branches of government to examine, advise, hear and support us.  
Id. at 22. 
31. See Cary, supra note 7, at 692 (“[Delaware has] in microcosm the ultimate example of the 
relationship between politics, the bar, and the judiciary. . . . [I]t is clear that Delaware may be 
characterized as a tight little club in which the corporate bar cites unreported decisions before the 
courts in which they practice.”). 
32. See id.  
33. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 74–75.  
34. Simmons, supra note 22, at 325.  
35. Del. Exec. Order No. 4, (2001) https://archivesfiles.delaware.gov/Executive-
Orders/Minner/Minner_EO04.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K99-SS8B]. In theory, twelve-year 
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In addition, the State Constitution mandates a political balance on the 
Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery.36 Such 
independence arguably gives court opinions more legitimacy than some 
legislative outcomes. Delaware is largely insulated from populist 
concerns that are palpable at the national level, except to the extent that 
the federal government makes state lawmakers aware of their potential 
encroachment on state law.37 Due to these contextual factors, managers 
and shareholders are the primary interest groups influencing Delaware 
corporate lawmaking. The federal government can be viewed as another.38 
Recently, similar to other states, Delaware has responded to stakeholder 
concerns by adopting a public benefit corporation statute.39 The 
widespread adoption of state social enterprise statutes has implications for 
the contemporary federal chartering debate: forestalling greater federal 
encroachment and potentially weakening the argument for federal 
chartering. 
C. Federal Lawmaking 
Compared to Delaware, federal government lawmaking is more 
pluralistic and involves more interest groups that reflect stakeholder and 
populist concerns.40 However, it demonstrates some reluctance to directly 
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs and to alter existing power 
relationships between managers and shareholders.41 Instead, it prefers to 
use more moderate forms of regulation, such as disclosure, potentially to 
prevent and to mollify political backlash from powerful corporate 
 
appointments limit the impact of electoral swings on judicial decision-making. Also, twelve-year 
terms and the prospect of not being reappointed may serve as a compromise to life tenure that may 
lessen accountability. For a critique of life tenure for federal judges, see Steven G. Calabresi & James 
Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 769 (2006).  
36. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
37. See Roe, supra note 24, at 2501. 
38. Simmons, supra note 22, at 325. 
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–68 (West 2021).  
40. See Roe, supra note 24, at 2518–19. Mark Roe describes the broader interests implicated at the 
federal level:  
More goes on in Washington than wider coalition possibilities. Public-regarding policymakers 
in Washington see themselves as custodians for the overall health of the American economy; 
accordingly, they could conclude that tight managerial accountability—beyond that which even 
interests institutional investors—would be best for the economy. The Council of Economic 
Advisors influences the President, the GAO writes reports, and the SEC often proposes rules that 
managers and institutional investors dislike. Of course, we shouldn’t naïvely think that interests 
don’t influence these players too, but the interests differ from Delaware’s, and sometimes the 
public-policy players have enough slack to be able to act on their ideological preferences. 
Id. at 2503. 
41. See Simmons, supra note 22, at 328.  
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constituencies.42 
The federal government may be more likely to address populist 
concerns, but increased interest-group pluralism does not necessarily 
negate manager and shareholder influence. Even if lawmakers enact more 
laws and regulations, the degree of enforcement determines their impact.43 
Passing public-regarding reforms may differ from earnestly pursuing the 
public interest.44 Knee-jerk and ad hoc responses and cosmetic, largely 
symbolic measures can be used to mitigate outrage from sometimes less-
informed corporate constituencies.45 
D. The Agency Analogy 
Given its institutional dynamics and its influence on U.S. corporate 
law, Delaware—particularly its judiciary—functions like a de facto 
agency. One observer describes Delaware’s agency-like role as follows: 
[The Chancery] is an exceptional court because it can be fairly 
described this way: as a governmental entity, directed by expert 
decision makers and assisted by a cadre of government-
supervised enforcement attorneys, armed with substantial 
rulemaking and adjudicating authority over the conduct and 
disclosure of transactions within its jurisdictional compass, and 
charged with using that authority to regulate a broad field of 
economic activity. Because Chancery sees and has the power to 
regulate a vast amount of M&A activity, its perspective is not 
episodic or narrow, but constant and, if not complete, very 
substantially representative. In all of these respects, it resembles 
a regulatory agency.46 
Typically, agencies function as rule makers with an eye to the future; 
they solicit comment from those who will be affected by regulations and 
the adoption of broader rules.47 By contrast, courts, as rule makers, look 
to the past and are mostly constrained to apply rules to situations with 
specific actors. 48 Accordingly, the “rules resulting from [administrative] 
rulemaking are generally thought to be more effective regulatory 
instruments—because their benefits and costs in the mine run of cases are 
 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 329. 
44. Id.  
45. Id.  
46. Savitt, supra note 2, at 586.  
47. Id. at 586–87. 
48. Id.  
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more thoroughly examined before adoption.”49 The Delaware Court of 
Chancery is able to operate as a de facto agency because of its deep 
expertise and wide exposure to relevant law. Therefore, it can issue more 
future-minded and forward-looking decisions without focusing only on 
the parties before the court. Like an agency issuing regulations, it issues 
dicta and pronouncements to influence future transactions.50 
The idea of courts serving as a regulatory agency is not far-fetched 
since the federal courts implement the antitrust laws using common law 
methodology.51 Some agencies such as the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) rely exclusively on adjudication to develop and enforce 
regulation.52 Most agencies (e.g., Federal Trade Commission (FTC)) use 
adjudication to some extent when adopting new or revised regulatory 
policy.53 Some academics assert the tort law system, driven by private 
plaintiffs, has regulatory effects.54 Despite the similarities between courts 
and agencies, there is a salient point of differentiation. All federal 
regulatory schemes are monopolies that companies cannot opt out of. By 
contrast, companies choose whether or not to incorporate in Delaware. 
One must concede that Delaware in this respect is unique. 
Delaware’s sustained function as a de facto agency is contingent upon 
a continuous wealth of cases (e.g., fiduciary duty) before its courts rather 
than litigation in different jurisdictions.55 According to one observer, 
“[e]ach case lost to another state is a lost opportunity to expand and refine 
Delaware fiduciary law. And because the courts of other states necessarily 
have less experience applying Delaware law, out-of-Delaware cases may 
be more opaque to defendants trying to predict and manage transactional 
risk.”56 Delaware offers network benefits, such as providing litigants with 
 
49. Id. at 587.  
50. See id. at 588–89; David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 
1854–55 (2001).  
51. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: 
Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349 
(2013); R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Address at the 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute Thirtieth Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and 
Policy (Oct. 23, 2003), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/common-law-approach-and-improving-
standards-analyzing-single-firm-conduct [https://perma.cc/CR2Y-SLZY] (“I will focus on how a 
common law approach to antitrust has led [the United States] toward an objective, transparent and 
economically based standard for assessing single firm conduct.”). 
52. See generally Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970). 
53. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1969) 
(explaining the FTC’s use of adjudication when revising regulations). 
54. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the Law of Torts, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 54, 54–58 (1999). 
55. Savitt, supra note 2, at 598.  
56. Id. at 599.  
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similar standards, that generate predictability for business planning.57 
Delaware’s de facto agency role and lawmaking function do raise 
concerns and criticisms. Some historic and contemporary critics assert 
that Delaware judges cannot be impartial because local interest groups, 
focused on securing lucrative corporate franchise fees and legal work, 
promote a pro-management ideology.58 These critiques, however, ignore 
structural safeguards designed to mitigate politicization and promote 
greater independence; for example, the bipartisan judicial nominating 
commission for selection, political balancing, and twelve-year term 
appointments.59 
Completely eradicating all politicization of the judiciary would be a tall 
task, but scholars acknowledge that certain measures can mitigate the 
influence of politics and ideology on judicial decision-making.60 Public 
choice scholars contend regulatory agencies are composed of self-seeking 
individuals.61 But they often ignore the role of formal and informal norms 
in agencies that may deter self-interest or one-sidedness. For example, 
professionalism is a key disciplining norm for agencies as well as courts.62 
By nature, courts are more apolitical than agencies yet not immune from 
interest group pressures or ideology.63 However, professionalism, in part, 
 
57. See id. at 577–85. 
58. Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 1499–508; Cary, supra note 7, at 666; Macey & Miller, supra note 
7, at 472. 
59. See Brief for Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 3, Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020) (No. 19-309) (“[T]he Framers 
of the Delaware Constitution of 1897 established a partisan balance requirement providing that no 
more than a bare majority of the state’s ‘law judges’ be members of the same political 
party . . . . These provisions have functioned to minimize the role of politics in Delaware’s judicial 
selection process, protecting public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and avoiding single 
party entrenchment.”); Id. at 24 (“To foster judicial independence, Delaware judges serve lengthy 12-
year terms, potentially giving governors the ability to shape the composition of the bench long after 
their time in office. The partisan balance requirements further ensure that the governor of a state 
whose citizens hold a wide range of views cannot structure a judiciary with a predominant or 
homogenous judicial philosophy.”). 
60. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Politicized Judicial Review in Administrative Law: 
Three Improbable Responses, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV 319, 355 (2012). 
61. See generally James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public 
Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II 11 (James M. 
Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 2009).  
62. See Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative 
Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 464–65 (2012). 
63. In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court held: 
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the 
judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated 
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the 
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not 
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this 
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deters judicial officers from being ideologues because their reputation, 
which they presumably care about, is determined by the degree of 
professionalism they exhibit. Delaware judicial officers ascribe to a 
salient professionalism norm given the reach and impact of their 
decisions. 
In any case, administrative agencies are far from a panacea for 
corporate problems. Federal regulation has its limitations. Although the 
views of regulated industries are relevant to the lawmaking process, they 
often prove determinative, crowding out the views of less organized but 
important interest groups. Even worse, agencies may be captured by the 
industries they regulate.64 Inevitably, their effectiveness relies on industry 
expertise, information, and cooperation.65 Even assuming agencies are 
staffed by virtuous public servants with no ambitions to secure lucrative 
jobs in industry, they are still dependent on political bodies like Congress 
for appropriations. These concerns are not reasons to abandon the 
regulatory process or to suggest that it lacks benefit. Instead, they stand 
as a reminder of its inherent limitations. 
The recent Supreme Court case Carney v. Adams66 underscores 
Delaware’s role as a de facto regulator.67 The Third Circuit ruled that 
Delaware’s judicial political balancing provisions were 
unconstitutional.68 Specifically, the decision addressed the 
constitutionality of article IV, section 3 of the Delaware Constitution, 
which provides, in relevant part, that (1) courts in Delaware cannot have 
more than a bare majority of justices from one political party (the Bare 
Majority Provision); and (2) the justices of the Supreme Court, the 
Superior Court, and the Court of Chancery must all be members of one 
 
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing 
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be 
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday 
realities. 
467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984). 
64. See Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of 
Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 591, 624 (2010). 
65. Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 BUS. LAW. 1125, 
1129–30 (1976); Omari Scott Simmons, The Corporate Immune System: Governance from the Inside 
Out, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1134–35 (2013). 
66. 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020). 
67. Adams v. Carney, No. CV 17-181-MPT, 2018 WL 2411219 (D. Del. May 23, 2018), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166 (3d. Cir. 2019), cert. granted 
sub nom. Carney v. Adams, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) (No. 19-309), vacated and remanded, 
Carney, 141 S. Ct. 493. 
68. Adams, 922 F.3d at 169. 
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major political party or the other (the Major Party Provision).69 
A U.S. Supreme Court Brief from Former Governors of the State of 
Delaware as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner counters that the 
“impact of Delaware’s constitutional commitment to political balance has 
been profound.”70 It points out that “[c]ross-party judicial appointments 
are a rarity in the federal courts” but not in Delaware.71 This brief 
articulates the potential consequences of striking down Delaware’s 
judicial political balancing provisions: 
Without the draw of Delaware’s specialized, nonpartisan 
judiciary, entities may choose to incorporate in different 
jurisdictions throughout the country, thereby irreparably 
fragmenting the nation’s currently unified corporate law. The 
consistency that Delaware furnishes in pronouncing the de facto 
corporate law of the United States has been a significant benefit 
to American businesses seeking capital in the domestic and 
international markets.72 
The brief adds: “Should the articulation of corporate law become 
scattered across numerous jurisdictions, reconsolidation would be 
difficult or impossible.”73 Further it acknowledges that “[t]he loss of 
Delaware’s status as the center of United States corporate law, anchored 
by a specialized, nonpartisan judiciary, would harm Delaware-
incorporated businesses nationwide.”74 
In reaching its conclusions, the Third Circuit made the blanket 
determination that judicial figures cannot be policymakers.75 It ignored 
“characteristics that cause [Delaware’s judicial lawmaking] to resemble 
the legislative process” and a de facto agency.76 They include, inter alia, 
a skeletal statutory corporate law framework that leaves the fundamental 
rights and obligations of stockholders and directors to be “supplied by 
judges, performing their traditional roles of making and applying common 
 
69. Id. at 170–71 (describing the Bare Majority Provision and the Major Party Provision); see 
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Decide if a State Can Consider Political Affiliation in Appointing 
Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/us/supreme-court-
political-affiliation-judges.html [https://perma.cc/YV4M-XS5G]. 
70. See Brief for Former Governors Delaware, supra note 28, at 5. 
71. See id. at 5–6. 
72. See id. at 9 (citing Simmons, supra note 2, at 239). 
73. See Brief for Former Governors Delaware, supra note 28, at 10. 
74. Id. 
75. Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166, 169 (3d. Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Carney 
v. Adams, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) (No. 19-309), vacated and remanded, Carney v. Adams, 
592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020). 
76. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1075, 1079 (2000).  
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law.”77 Delaware’s judiciary is entrusted with the creation of corporate 
law and policy and functions as a de facto agency.78 The legitimacy of the 
U.S. corporate governance system, of which Delaware is an integral part, 
largely hinges on the perception that it is largely apolitical, less biased, 
and fair, even to non-prevailing parties.79 In Delaware, the legal 
environment is stable, contributing to and reinforcing a stable climate for 
investment and business planning. The apparent lack of politicization and 
flip-flopping that characterize other jurisdictions make Delaware a more 
attractive venue for resolving corporate disputes. Recently, the U.S. 
Supreme Court dismissed the Adams case on standing grounds, keeping 
Delaware’s judicial balancing provisions intact but leaving questions 
regarding their constitutionality unresolved.80 
II. THE FEDERAL CHARTERING DEBATE 
Major U.S. corporations are global in scope and impact, but the laws 
under which they are created and acquire their legal character are mostly 
local. From this tension emerges the desire to subject them to federal law. 
The longstanding federal corporate chartering debate is, in essence, a 
referendum on the legitimacy of Delaware’s shared role in U.S. corporate 
governance. It raises crucial questions about such reform objectives as 
(1) limiting the power of corporations within society; and (2) ensuring 
corporate managers exercise their power with greater accountability for 
shareholder and stakeholder interests. 
A. The Recurrence of Federal Corporate Chartering Proposals 
Despite over two centuries of debate, federal corporate chartering 
proposals have not become law.81 Their advancement exhibits an 
 
77. Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances in 
Which It Is Equitable to Take that Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 
60 BUS. LAW. 877, 879 (2005). 
78. Id. Other Chancery Court features are administrative in nature. For example, “[w]ithout the 
need for a live controversy, the Court of Chancery may hear applications to validate defective 
corporate acts, order the Delaware Secretary of State to accept the filing of certain instruments, declare 
stock issuances to be effective, and order the holding of stockholder meetings or director elections.” 
Brief for Former Governors of Delaware, supra note 28, at 13–14. 
79. For a general discussion of the concept of legitimacy, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy 
and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1827 (2005). See also Omari Scott Simmons, Picking 
Friends from the Crowd: Amicus Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185 (2009). 
80. Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493, 503–04 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
81. Although beyond the scope of this Article, banking is regulated at both the federal and state 
levels. Federal bank chartering is employed in the banking context where the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has extensive powers over banking practices. In 1863, Congress 
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interesting pattern. They arise when public sentiment and concern 
“mounts about the concentration of corporate economic and political 
power.”82 They often coincide with periods of economic turmoil and 
social upheaval, when other types of corporate reform legislation are 
passed. 
At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, James Madison twice 
proposed, albeit unsuccessfully, that the Constitution expressly authorize 
Congress to grant corporate charters where public goods so require and 
where a single state authority may not be competent.83 States initially 
managed corporations through short-term, state-issued charters, which 
maintained corporate compliance under threat of nonrenewal.84 However, 
corporate power significantly strengthened with the expansion of 
domestic and interstate markets. 
Advocacy for federal incorporation in the 1880s contributed, in part, to 
 
created the OCC as part of the National Currency Act to regulate and charter national banks. See Act 
of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 11, 12 Stat. 665, 668 (repealed 1864). In 1864, the National Bank Act 
replaced the National Currency Act. See Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The OCC has multiple objectives including ensuring the soundness 
of the national banking system. See generally Howard H. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 
VA. L. REV. 565 (1966) (discussing the history of the National Banking Act); Larry Yackle, Federal 
Banks and Federal Jurisdiction in the Progressive Era: A Case Study of Smith v. K.C. Title and Trust 
Co., 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 255 (2013). 
82. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1126.  
83. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE CORRUPTION: THE ABUSE OF POWER 183 (1990); 
see also CHARLES PERROW, ORGANIZING AMERICA: WEALTH, POWER, AND THE ORIGINS OF 
CORPORATE CAPITALISM 32 (2005) (“[In the eighteenth and nineteenth century,] [c]itizens and elites 
recognized . . . that permitting the existence of large organizations that were primarily responsive only 
to owners, and not to the public, was a fateful act.”). Federal chartering received at least brief 
consideration during the Constitutional Convention, however. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional 
Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic 
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 944 n.19 (1952); Gregory A. Mark, The Court and the Corporation: 
Jurisprudence, Localism, and Federalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 412 (1997). There was an 
Incorporation Committee, but apparently it did little. See Mark, supra, at 412. When Benjamin 
Franklin proposed that the federal government be granted the power to cut canals, James Madison 
moved that an amendment be made to provide the power “to grant charters of incorporation where 
the interest of the U.S. might require & the legislative provisions of the individual States may be 
incompetent.” Id. (quoting DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE 
AMERICAN STATES 724 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927)). Rufus King, chair of the Incorporation 
Committee, argued that the proposed power was “unnecessary” and that the states “will be prejudiced 
and divided into parties.” Mark, supra, at 412. The proposed amendment failed, by a vote of three 
states in favor and eight against. Id. 
84. See Charlie Cray, Using Charters to Redesign Corporations in the Public Interest, in THE 
BOTTOM LINE OR PUBLIC HEALTH 303 (William H. Wiist, ed., 2010). Corporate charters originally 
defined a corporation’s purpose, and when a corporation violated (or acted outside of) its stated 
purpose, the state legislature could dissolve the corporation. See generally Kent Greenfield & D. 
Gordon Smith, Debate: Saving the World with Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J. 947 (2008). 
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the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”).85 In addition 
to the passage of the Sherman Act, Congress passed the Tillman Act of 
190786 to restrict corporate power by limiting corporations and banks from 
making federal campaign contributions.87 By the twentieth century, 
Progressive Era reformers perceived “bigness” as a threat to democratic 
institutions, and a federal incorporation framework, although never 
adopted, was perceived as a potential solution.88 
Twenty different corporate chartering-related bills were introduced in 
Congress between 1903 and 1914;89 none became law. Presidents 
Theodore Roosevelt, Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson all voiced 
support for a federal corporate chartering or licensing scheme in their 
annual State of the Union Addresses.90 In his first address to Congress in 
 
85. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7); see Susan 
Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of 
Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 117 (1999) (“[T]he Sherman Act deliberations involved 
discussions of federal incorporation, [but] the final statute left the primary power to charter 
corporations with the states.”); see also WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 63, 85–99 (1956) (discussing the strong 
sentiments against monopolies implicated in corporation law and analyzing the legislative history of 
the Sherman Act). 
86. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). 
87. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441b(a)). 
88. In 1898, Congress established the Industrial Commission to investigate and propose national 
policy on various industrial and commercial issues. See Act of June 18, 1898, ch. 466, 30 Stat. 476. 
In 1902, the Commission’s final report suggested federal chartering may limit corporate “bigness.” 
U.S. INDUS. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 57-380, at 
643, 651 (1st Sess. 1902) (“Federal supervision, under some form, which may control the 
combinations doing an interstate business, is therefore of chief importance. . . . [If supervision alone 
fails to curb corporate abuses,] it may be wise for the Congress to enact a Federal incorporation law.”); 
see also Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 160, 180 (1982) (“On January 7, 1910, Taft sent a message to Congress calling upon it to pass 
a federal incorporation law. The vagueness of certain parts of the Sherman Law, the conflicting 
interpretations handed down in different federal courts, the interstate nature of big business all called 
for new means to control unlawful suppression of competition while reassuring honest businessmen 
of the legitimacy of their actions.”). At the 1899 Chicago Conference on Trusts, William Jennings 
Bryan, the 1896 and 1900 Democratic presidential candidate, endorsed federal chartering. See 
Urofsky, supra, at 165–66. Bryan’s federal chartering proposal required a federal charter for 
companies to do business outside their home state of incorporation, which would only be granted if 
the firm met strict capitalization and business policy requirements, and the firm was not a monopoly. 
See id. at 166. If a corporation attempted to create a monopoly or violated any other federal chartering 
rules, then their charter would be revoked. Id. 
89. FED. TRADE COMM’N, UTILITY CORPORATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 70–92, at 32–51 (1st Sess. 1934). 
See CLINARD, supra note 83, at 183.  
90. Roe, supra note 24, at 602. For a broader discussion of presidential endorsements of federal 
chartering, see Joel F. Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big Business: An Idea Whose Time 
Has Come?, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915, 919 (1972), and Comment, A Federal System of Licenses and 
Charters, 25 GEO. L.J. 700, 704 (1937) (exploring Theodore Roosevelt’s strong support of federal 
 
Simmons (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:01 PM 
2021] THE FEDERAL OPTION 953 
 
1901, Teddy Roosevelt stated, “the Government should have the right to 
inspect and examine the workings of the great corporations engaged in 
interstate business.”91 He proposed a new Bureau of Corporations as an 
extension of the Department of Commerce, while Congress 
simultaneously considered a federal incorporation bill.92 Roosevelt was a 
major proponent of federal incorporation, expressing his support for 
federal chartering in a 1905 message to Congress: 
Experience has shown conclusively that it is useless to try to get 
any adequate regulation and supervision of these great 
corporations by [S]tate action. Such regulation and supervision 
can only be effectively exercised by a sovereign whose 
jurisdiction is coextensive with the field of work of the 
corporations—that is, by the [N]ational [G]overnment.93 
Ironically, Roosevelt is indirectly responsible for Delaware’s 
dominance. His criticism encouraged then-Governor of New Jersey 
Woodrow Wilson to promote the Seven Sisters legislation, which 
contributed to the migration of firms from New Jersey to Delaware.94 
President Taft directed his Attorney General to draft a federal licensing 
bill,95 which was endorsed by the Wall Street Journal in 1908 and 
presented to Congress in 1910.96 Federal chartering and federal licensing 
 
incorporation and Woodrow Wilson’s endorsement of federal licensing). See also MORTON KELLER, 
REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933, 
at 26–29 (1990) (discussing the appeal of federal incorporation as a response to the argument that 
“the rise of big business was national in character, and thus required a national government 
response”). 
91. President Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Dec. 3, 1901).  
92. H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375 (1903).  
93. Dorrance Dibell Snapp, National Incorporation, 5 ILL. L. Rev. 414, 415 (1910–1911) (quoting 
President Theodore Roosevelt, Address to Congress (Dec. 3, 1905)). 
94. See Sarath Sanga, The Origins of the Market for Corporate Law 3 n.11 (March 20, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3503628 
[https://perma.cc/253G-RJHB] (“In 1913, Woodrow Wilson, then governor of New Jersey, proposed 
the ‘Seven Sisters Act,’ effectively outlawing the trust and holding company.”); Cary, supra note 7, 
at 664 (“Delaware, seeking new sources of revenue, copied very largely from the New Jersey act to 
establish its own statute. Then in 1913, at the insistence of Governor Woodrow Wilson, New Jersey 
drastically tightened its law relating to corporations and trusts with a series of provisions known as 
the seven sisters. Since Delaware did not amend its statute, it took the lead at that time and has never 
lost it . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); see also E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the 
Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV. 163, 167 (2004) (explaining how Woodrow Wilson’s Seven 
Sisters Act created a migration from New Jersey to Delaware). 
95. See Urofsky, supra note 88, at 180. 
96. Id. (“On January 7, 1910, Taft sent a message to Congress calling upon it to pass a federal 
incorporation law. . . . Attorney-General George W. Wickersham soon afterward presented a draft to 
the chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, who sponsored it as the Clark-Parker 
bills (S. 6186 and H. R. 20142).”); see also RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING 
THE GIANT CORPORATION 67 (1976). 
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are not the same. Although chartering and licensing have some similar 
characteristics and goals, as discussed later in Part V, there are important 
distinctions. Federal chartering effectively means that state chartering will 
either cease for certain corporations or will be superseded. Meanwhile, 
federal licensing does not eliminate the need for state charters, but 
imposes additional requirements on companies engaged in interstate 
commerce. The 1904 Democratic, 1908 Republican, and 1912 
Democratic platforms each included different federal corporate chartering 
or licensing proposals.97 
The federal incorporation debate rekindled in the 1930s, when the New 
Deal produced significant reforms, particularly federal securities laws.98 
The post-World War II era witnessed an explosion of legislation and 
reform that subsumed the corporate chartering debate to some extent. The 
1970s witnessed another resurgence of the debate. Consumer advocate 
Ralph Nader and others argued that federal chartering would promote 
corporate democracy, personal liability for management, stricter antitrust 
requirements, and enhanced disclosure standards regarding social, 
environmental, and economic impacts.99 During the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, two massive pieces of federal regulation, Sarbanes-
Oxley100 and Dodd-Frank,101 subsumed the federal chartering 
discussion.102 
Recently, U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders both 
proposed federal corporate chartering. In keeping with the historical 
pattern, public concern about corporate concentration and power103 is 
 
97. See Cray, supra note 84, at 303. 
98. The primary federal securities laws include the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj. See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. 
Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 342–47 (1988); Schwartz, supra note 65, at 
1126–27. 
99. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1127. 
100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
101. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 17, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 U.S.C.). 
102. See MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 191–224 
(2018). 
103. See Kiran Stacey, Kadhim Shubber & Hannah Murphy, Which Antitrust Investigations Should 
Big Tech Worry About?, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/abcc5070-f68f-
11e9-a79c-bc9acae3b654 (last visited Aug. 27, 2021) (summarizing all recent calls to break up big 
tech and the current related ongoing investigations); Andy Kessler, Antitrust Can’t Catch Big Tech, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2019, 3:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/antitrust-cant-catch-big-tech-
11568577387 [https://perma.cc/78KH-KHEV] (discussing how the House Judiciary Committee is the 
latest group to open an antitrust investigation against big tech, joining forty-eight state attorney 
generals, the Justice Department, and the Federal Trade Commission).  
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currently amplified by a global health pandemic and widespread racial 
unrest.104 All of society’s institutions have come under increased scrutiny, 
especially corporations’ role in, and accountability for, economic and 
social outcomes.105 Whereas previous cycles of corporate reform and 
regulation strengthened the hand of shareholders and contributed to 
greater shareholder voice, the contemporary focus targets corporate 
accountability for environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related 
outcomes.106 In this environment, the power of celebrated companies like 
Facebook and Alphabet have become the subject of heightened regulatory 
scrutiny following years of relatively lax oversight.107 
B. The Academic Debate 
Delaware’s jurisdictional dominance is one of the most debated topics 
among corporate law scholars.108 Traditional accounts in the academic 
 
104. Lucy Colback, The Role of the Corporation in Society, FIN. TIMES (July 10, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/482a8435-c04c-4be8-9856-941e7ecf128a [https://perma.cc/7RRV-
EF44].  
105.  See Tracy Jan et al., Corporate America’s $50 billion promise, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2021), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/interactive/2021/george-floyd-corporate-america-racial-
justice/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2021); Paul Roberts, Costco and Boeing, Commit Tens of Millions to 
Social Justice Programs, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 28, 2020), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/local-business/two-of-washingtons-biggest-companies-
costco-and-boeing-commit-tens-of-millions-to-social-justice-programs/ [https://perma.cc/5K7E-
Q4HV]; Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, CEOs Lead America’s New Great Awakening, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 
2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ceos-lead-americas-new-great-awakening-11618505076 (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2021). 
106. Lisa M. Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism: The Emergence, Impact, and Future of 
Shareholder Activism as the New Corporate Governance Norm, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1301, 1342–43 
(2019). 
107. See Raymond G. Lahoud, Facebook Faces Lawsuit Alleging Discrimination Against U.S. 
Workers, 11 NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/facebook-faces-
lawsuit-alleging-discrimination-against-us-workers [https://perma.cc/H2CA-8M8G]; see also Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Sues Monopolist Google for Violating Antitrust 
Laws (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-monopolist-google-
violating-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/4795-N4KR]. 
108. See Cary, supra note 7, at 666 (asserting state competition is a race-to-the-bottom benefiting 
management, sometimes at the expense of shareholders, and that this state of affairs demands a greater 
federal role); see also Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977) (asserting state competition is a race to the top 
benefiting shareholders); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 1, at 556 (asserting Delaware has a 
monopoly on out of state charters); Fisch, supra note 76, at 1064 (asserting Delaware sustains its 
advantage through judge-made corporate law); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, 
Myth] (asserting Delaware is the only state to truly compete for incorporations); Marcel Kahan & 
Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 
1208 (2001) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination] (asserting Delaware employs price 
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literature overwhelmingly focus on and at times overstate potential 
domestic threats, such as interstate competition and federal preemption 
via a comprehensive corporate code. 
En route to determining whether corporate federalism results in optimal 
corporate law, most of the debate surrounding Delaware’s dominant 
position in state charter competition is based on race-to-the-top versus 
race-to-the-bottom theories.109 Generally, race-to-the-top theories contend 
that the high quality of Delaware law attracts promoters, managers, and 
investors.110 Race-to-the-bottom theorists assert that to attract 
incorporating firms and lucrative franchise fees, Delaware and other states 
adopt minimal standards that limit manager accountability at the expense 
of shareholders.111 These theories are simplistic and do not accurately 
describe state charter competition, especially where it is not robust for 
large, publicly traded corporations.112 
In the 1970s, Ralph Winter and William Cary were leading voices in 
this vigorous debate. For Winter, state competition spurs a race-to-the-
top, where manager and shareholder interests eventually converge 
because managers realize that promoting shareholder wealth lessens the 
likelihood of bankruptcy and takeover, which threaten their 
incumbency.113 This model generally assumes an efficient market and the 
 
discrimination through franchise taxes and litigation-intensive substantive law); Kahan & Rock, supra 
note 2, at 1578 (asserting that Delaware and the federal government complement each other by 
working on the areas the other cannot regulate as effectively); Roe, supra note 24, at 2494 (asserting 
the relationship between Delaware and federal actors is more important than any state-to-state race); 
Roe, supra note 23, at 590 (asserting there can be no pure state-to-state race because of the threat of 
federal intervention); Simmons, supra note 2 (asserting that the greatest threat to Delaware’s 
preeminence is not domestic but foreign competition). 
109. Theories of regulatory competition (e.g., race-to-the-top) reflect the Tiebout Model of 
regulatory competition but did not originate among corporate law scholars. See, e.g., Charles M. 
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (predicting 
competition between states will lead to an efficient match between demands of citizens for public 
goods and public goods supported by the state). 
110. Race-to-the-top theories presume manager and shareholder interests converge in the long run 
because managers realize promoting shareholder wealth lessens the likelihood of bankruptcy and 
takeover, which threaten managerial incumbency. This model, of course, assumes an efficient market 
and the absence of other confounding factors. Cf., id. 
111. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in 
part) (“Lesser States, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters, had removed 
safeguards from their own incorporation laws. . . . The race was one not of diligence but of laxity.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Cary, supra note 7, at 663 (“Delaware is both the sponsor and the victim of a 
system contributing to the deterioration of corporation standards. This unhappy state of affairs[] 
stem[s] in great part from the movement toward the least common denominator . . . .”).  
112. Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 108, at 684 (“[T]he very notion that states compete for 
incorporations is a myth. Other than Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract 
incorporations of public companies.”). 
113. See Winter, Jr., supra note 108, at 275–76. 
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absence of other confounding factors.114 
Alternatively, Cary contended that reliance on incorporation fees for 
revenues led Delaware to “race for the bottom” with other states, adopting 
laws that favored managers over shareholders.115 His deep and incisive 
critique extended to proposing federal legislation to establish a Federal 
Minimal Standards Act that would preempt Delaware’s influence.116 
Adherents of the race-to-the-bottom view expressed skepticism that 
market dynamics would result in optimal corporate legislation.117 Cary 
was particularly critical of Delaware lawyers and judges, who, he 
asserted, could not be trusted to operate consistently in the national 
interest.118 His proposed remedies fell short of federal chartering but 
significantly influenced the federal chartering debate.119 
Research illustrates that competition between states is not robust and 
suggests that Delaware targets large, publicly traded corporations rather 
than less lucrative chartering market segments; for example, small and 
medium-sized enterprises.120 Moreover, other states’ franchise fee 
structures reveal they do not have the same economic incentives to 
 
114. Winter’s race-to-the-top theory did not originate among corporate law scholars and was 
influenced by the Tiebout Model of regulatory competition. See, e.g., Tiebout, supra note 109, at 418 
(predicting competition between states will lead to an efficient match between demands of citizens 
for public goods and public goods supported by the state). 
115. See Cary, supra note 7, at 664. 
116. Id. “[I]n my opinion the time has come for us to consider a Federal Minimum Standards Act. 
There has been a deterioration of corporate standards, and I think it is safe to say that Delaware has 
been the sponsor and the victim of this unhappy denouement. . . . [T]here has been a race for the 
bottom.” William L. Cary, Summary of Article on Federalism and Corporate Law, 31 BUS. LAW. 
1105, 1105 (1976). 
117. See, e.g., Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545 
(1984) (arguing that there are major defects in the current laws controlling corporate governance, that 
the market for charters prevents the states from correcting these problems, and that the American Law 
Institute’s Corporate Governance project should be adopted as the solution); Detlev Vagts, The 
Governance of the Corporation: The Options Available and the Power to Prescribe, 31 BUS. LAW. 
929 (1976) (arguing that only federal action can improve and simplify corporate law); Note, Federal 
Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89 (1972) (arguing that the chartering market 
has caused states to abdicate their responsibilities to govern corporations, and that federal chartering 
is the solution); Stanley A. Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 
31 BUS. LAW. 883 (1976) (arguing that federal law on fiduciary duties of management is preferable 
to state law, and that Delaware statutory and case law is over-favorable to management.); Richard W. 
Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. LAW. 991 (1976) 
(arguing that because of the market for charters, only federal law can adequately regulate managerial 
misconduct). 
118. See Cary, supra note 7, at 687–88. 
119. NADER ET AL., supra note 96, at 69. 
120. Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra note 108, at 1209 (“Delaware uses its uniquely 
structured franchise tax to charge a higher incorporation price to public corporations than it does to 
nonpublic corporations, and that among public corporations, it charges a higher price to larger 
corporations than it does to smaller ones.”). 
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compete for corporate charters as Delaware.121 
A common theme in the academic literature is the tension between the 
respective roles of the federal government and the state of Delaware in the 
regulation of internal corporate affairs.122 However, “[f]rom a global 
perspective, this approach is shortsighted because the destinies of 
Delaware and the nation are intertwined in the face of the common threat 
of global competition” and potential corporate migration to foreign 
jurisdictions.123 Regardless of differences in scope—external trading and 
disclosure versus internal affairs—federal securities laws and state 
corporate law share a historical core concern: investor protection.124 In the 
contemporary context, the scope is expanding to address broader 
stakeholder concerns.125 From a functional standpoint, U.S. corporate 
 
121. See Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 108, at 687 (“Other than Delaware, no state structures 
its taxes to gain from incorporations or stands to reap substantial benefits from legal business by 
attracting incorporations.”). 
122. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1576 ([T]he possibility of federal preemption constitutes 
a threat to Delaware, but this threat is significant only in times—such as during the recent corporate 
scandals—when systemic change is seen as generating a significant populist payoff.”). 
123. Simmons, supra note 2, at 221; see also William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 
NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1422 (2020) (“While judges may be more hesitant to extend the internal affairs 
doctrine to corporations incorporated in foreign nations, the doctrine has been extended enough to 
enable foreign nations to effectively compete with Delaware for corporate charters.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Christopher M. Bruner, Leveraging Corporate Law: A Broader Account of Delaware’s 
Competition 4 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of L., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-29, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3530397 [https://perma.cc/9TEQ-YW7A] (“[T]he attractions of Delaware 
business entities have not gone unnoticed internationally, and in this context Delaware faces 
considerable competition from a range of jurisdictions—perhaps notably various British Overseas 
Territories such as Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands, another category of 
sub-sovereign jurisdictions active in global corporate and financial services.”). 
124. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Many other sections of the 
securities laws explicitly refer to investor protection. See Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g; 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b); National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 § 106(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b. The securities laws mention the phrase “investor 
protection” or “protection of investor” over two hundred times. Michael D. Guttentag, Protection 
from What? Investor Protection and the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 212 (2013). 
125. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act’s CEO Pay Ratio Rule now requires most reporting 
companies to provide new disclosures of the median employee’s pay and a ratio comparing the CEO’s 
compensation with this value. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule for 
Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html 
[https://perma.cc/3BMZ-EXBF]; Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,150 (Aug. 18, 2015) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 240, 249 (2021)) (“[W]hile neither the statute nor the related legislative 
history directly states the objectives or intended benefits of the provision, we believe . . . that [the Pay 
Ratio Rule] was intended to provide shareholders with a company-specific metric that can assist in 
their evaluation of . . . executive compensation practices.”). But see Press Release, Senator Bob 
Menendez, Menendez Applauds SEC Movement on Disclosing CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratios (Sept. 18, 
2013), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-applauds-sec-move 
ment-on-disclosing-ceo-to-worker-pay-ratios [https://perma.cc/LH6P-SPKX] (“We have middle 
class Americans who have gone years without seeing a pay raise, while CEO pay is soaring. This 
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governance is a mixed system involving the interaction of state law 
competition with federal intervention (or the threat thereof).126 According 
to domestic and international observers, “Delaware’s key contribution to 
U.S. corporate governance is the production of substantially judge-made 
corporate law—a public good providing dynamic guidance to 
multinational firms and practitioners as well as a deterrent for wayward 
business behavior.”127 By “routinely deciding these business disputes, 
Delaware courts—through well-established precedents—influence 
domestic and foreign courts as well as corporate stakeholders 
worldwide.”128 
C. Corporate Power, Shareholders, and Stakeholders 
Accountability remains the threshold issue in corporate governance. In 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means address its two dimensions: (1) the internal minimization of 
agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and control 
between diffuse shareholders and managers, and (2) the external abuse of 
 
simple benchmark will help investors monitor both how a company treats its average workers and 
whether its executive pay is reasonable.”). In August 2012, the SEC issued a conflict minerals 
reporting requirement––in fulfillment of Dodd-Frank § 502––aimed at protecting human rights in 
Africa. The rule requires publicly traded companies and foreign issuers using conflict minerals––like 
gold, tantalum, tin, etc.––to disclose their usage to the SEC to determine whether any of their products 
contain conflict minerals. See Fatima Alali & Sophia I-Ling Wang, Conflict Minerals Disclosure 
Requirements and Corporate Social Responsibility, CPA J. (July 2018), 
https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/07/18/conflict-minerals-disclosure-requirements-and-corporate-
social-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/NVK3-8ZPG] (“In the quest to improve corporate 
responsibility efforts and support the global trend of addressing human rights and supply chain risks, 
advocates of sustainability have turned their focus to the area of conflict minerals.”). Public Benefit 
Corporation statutes are another example of stakeholder influence. See David A. Katz & Laura 
McIntosh, The Corporate Form for Social Good, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 24, 
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/24/the-corporate-form-for-social-good/ [https://per 
ma.cc/55VL-ATLF] (“State legislation allowing the establishment of benefit corporations—for-profit 
companies with a stated public purpose—has become widespread over the past decade. This 
increasingly available corporate form provides a mandate, and a safe harbor, for corporate leaders to 
pursue societal good along with shareholder profits.”). 
126. Simmons, supra note 2, at 221; see also Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 1499–508 (recognizing the 
potential of federal intervention as a detriment to state law competition and international competition); 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1578 (proposing state and federal regulation complement each other 
by regulating in areas where the other cannot). 
127. Simmons, supra note 2, at 221. 
128. Id. at 222; see also Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 
J. CORP. L. 771, 786 (2009); Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of 
Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 212 (2011) (“The judicial opinions 
that result from frequent litigation benefit all members of the Delaware network, because such 
opinions provide firms with interpretive guidance on matters of Delaware corporate law.”). 
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corporate power at the expense of society at-large.129 The first, 
shareholder-centric dimension has dominated the corporate governance 
debate in the United States for the past fifty years, while U.S. scholars 
have only relatively recently accepted the latter, stakeholder dimension,130 
which reflects a populist uneasiness with concentrations of corporate 
power, the lack of accountability for negative externalities, and broader 
stakeholder concerns.131 Proponents of federal chartering see it as a 
mechanism to make the exercise of corporate power more accountable. 
Historically, “[l]egal debates over corporate social responsibility 
stretch from the 1930s to the twenty-first century.”132 The academic 
discussion can be traced to the Berle–Dodd debate of the 1930s,133 but 
amidst contemporary social, economic, and political upheaval, scholars, 
policymakers, and the public are paying renewed attention to stakeholder 
concerns.134 Skeptics contend that “stakeholderism” is either shareholder 
 
129. See BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra note 10, at 11–13, 17–18. 
130. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 439–41 (2001) (asserting the most prominent global corporate governance paradigm 
is shareholder wealth maximization). But see Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The 
Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 680 (2006) (defining 
“stakeholder” as any group of individuals impacted by corporate actions, regardless of whether such 
group desires corporate profit maximization); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual 
Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1274 (1999) (asserting corporate decisions often implicate non-shareholder 
concerns). 
131. In discussing the populist uneasiness with growing corporate power, one scholar noted: 
The progressive alternative, which is derived from the stakeholder theory of the corporation, 
suggests that corporate managers’ underlying social obligations are more extensive than 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth within the confines of the law. Specifically, progressive 
scholars contend that directors . . . ought to consider the implications of their actions on 
employees, consumers, suppliers (in some cases), the community, and the environment. 
Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 705, 716 (2002); see also Simmons, supra note 22, at 333; BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra 
note 10, at 11–13, 17–18 (examining the consequences of separation of corporate ownership and 
control). 
132. C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical 
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2002). 
133. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 
(1931) (arguing that corporate managers should be legally compelled to make decisions benefiting all 
stakeholders); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145 (1932) (countering Berle by arguing that corporate managers only owe a duty to their 
shareholders to maximize stock price); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are 
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (countering Dodd by arguing that in practice 
corporate managers affect more than just their stockholders and should be under legal control).  
134. See Lucian A Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 
106 CORNELL. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2020); Colin Mayer, Shareholderism Versus Stakeholderism—A 
Misconceived Contradiction. A Comment on “The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance” by 
Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. L. Working Paper, Paper 
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primacy under another name or a creative attempt to limit the 
accountability and broaden the discretion of directors.135 They believe that 
the current corporate law regime offers no incentives to promote 
stakeholder welfare against shareholder concerns.136 They also argue 
attempts to do so could hurt stakeholders by reducing the incentives for 
direct, external stakeholder-focused regulation.137 Skepticism about 
director incentives, stakeholder claims, and corporate actions to address 
them raises relevant and salient points. However, such speculation is not 
an adequate defense of the status quo.138 
Stakeholder proponents fall along a continuum. At one end, they 
contend that the concentration of corporate power and adoption of a 
myopic perspective upholding shareholder primacy requires an aggressive 
overhaul of the existing corporate law framework.139 They view it and 
 
No. 522/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617847 [https://perma.cc/Z96Z-2Z38]; see also 
Martin Lipton, Directors Have a Duty to Look Beyond Their Shareholders, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 18, 
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/6e806580-d560-11e9-8d46-8def889b4137 (last visited Aug. 27, 
2021); Jessica C. Pearlman, COVID-19 Pandemic Highlights Need for Stakeholders to Be 
Considered, A.B.A.: BUS. L. TODAY (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2020/04/covid-stakeholders/ 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2021) (“[T]he interconnectivity of various aspects of the economy [––workers, 
firms, investors and governmental officials––] is more apparent now during our current global 
[COVID-19] health crisis. . . . This interconnectivity means we are all the stakeholders. Short-
termism hurts us all. We cannot focus on short-term profits alone over the long-term health of the 
business or over the needs of employees, the needs of the planet, or the needs of the community to be 
able to get back to health.”). 
135. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 134, at 91.  
136. See generally id.  
137. Id. at 100 (“[W]ith corporate leaders having incentives not to benefit stakeholders at 
shareholders’ expense, . . . delegating the guardianship of stakeholder interest to corporate leaders 
would not be supported, but rather impeded by the force of economic incentives. . . . [A]ccepting 
stakeholderism would be substantially detrimental to shareholders, stakeholders, and society.”).  
138. See generally Richard W. Painter, Board Diversity: A Response to Professor Fried (Apr. 11, 
2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3824245 [https://perma.cc/Q6T3-REQ9].  
139. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to 
Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1772–73 (2006) 
(explaining the short-term approach to investment); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of 
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1283 (2002) (explaining the collapse of Enron in terms of 
risk-prone policy, short-term decision-making); Martin Lipton, Theodore N. Mirvis & Jay W. Lorsch, 
The Proposed “Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009”, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
(May 12, 2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/05/12/the-proposed-shareholder-bill-of-
rights-act-of-2009/ [https://perma.cc/2YWF-PS9W] (“Short-termism is a disease that infects 
American business and distorts management and boardroom judgment.”); Robert G. Eccles, Leo E. 
Strine, Jr. & Timothy Youmans, Purpose with Meaning: A Practical Way Forward, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 16, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/202 0/05/16/purpose-
with-meaning-a-practical-way-forward/ [https://perma.cc/P8SS-N7PC] (“If companies and 
institutional investors are serious about responsible, sustainable wealth creation in a manner fair to all 
corporate stakeholders, . . . [then it] will require a new governance form that makes a company’s 
obligations to fulfill its purpose enforceable.”). 
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Delaware’s de facto agency status as an impediment to stakeholder 
governance. 
At the other end, proponents contend that stakeholder governance, 
involving a balancing of interests, is consistent with existing corporate 
law frameworks, particularly the business judgment rule.140 From this 
perspective, corporate law does not mandate shareholder primacy. 
Instead, it provides a broader continuum of options for director decision-
making and considers balancing interests a vital part of the managerial 
role.141 Within this framework, directors’ decisions can balance 
stakeholder interests and receive business judgment rule protection.142 
In essence, shareholder and stakeholder approaches reflect a tension 
between two visions of corporate governance: a tight focus on investor 
return and a panorama that encompasses all constituencies affected by the 
corporate entity. One can find support for either approach in existing case 
law.143 
 
140. Martin Lipton, Steve Rosenblum and William Savitt summarize this argument: 
Stakeholder governance is fully consistent with well-established principles of corporate law and 
the existing fiduciary duty framework for directors. The directors of a corporation have a 
fiduciary duty to promote the success and value of the corporation, and the means and time 
horizon for achieving such goals are within the purview of the board’s business judgment. 
Furthermore, the exercise of balancing competing interests and risks to pursue the best interests 
of the corporation is the very core of business judgment, and the decisions of unconflicted 
directors, acting upon careful deliberation, will be fully protected by the business judgment rule. 
Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum & William Savitt, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 
2020: A Mid-Year Update, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 2, 2020), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/02/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2020-a-mid-
year-update/ [https://perma.cc/5Q9W-EX7A]; see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits 
in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 733 (2005); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A 
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999). 
141. Blair & Stout, supra note 140, at 305 (“[A] broad interpretation of the business judgment rule 
that permits directors to sacrifice shareholders’ interests to those of other corporate constituencies 
‘ties the hands’ of shareholders in public corporations in a fashion that ultimately serves their interests 
as a class, as well as those of the other members of the corporate coalition.”). 
142. Jessica C. Pearlman, Interview with Marty Lipton, 75 BUS. LAW. 1709, 1719 (2020) (“There’s 
no statute in Delaware that says the board of directors has a fiduciary duty to maximize value for the 
shareholders.”). 
143.  See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(“Although such considerations [of other corporate constituencies] may be permissible, there are 
fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. A board may have regard for various constituencies in 
discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the 
stockholders.”); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is the obligation of 
directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s 
stockholders.”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Having 
chosen a for-profit corporate form, . . . directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that 
accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the 
benefit of its stockholders.”); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(“Directors of a Delaware corporation owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders 
which require that they strive prudently and in good faith to maximize the value of the corporation 
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D. Political Economy 
1. The Contemporary Moment 
The present political moment, characterized by broad calls to address a 
global pandemic, racial injustice, socio-economic inequality, corporate 
concentrations, and ESG factors will likely result in corporate reform.144 
The more challenging question is what form will it take. One can argue 
that corporate governance is inherently political. The vast power of 
corporations, vested in a bureaucracy led by a small management group, 
affects society in myriad ways.145 Thousands of routine corporate 
decisions have significant and far-reaching public impacts but are often 
anonymous and largely insulated from external second-guessing.146 The 
robust data set of history makes clear that corporate power should be a 
matter of public concern.147 The checks on a corporation’s economic 
 
for the benefit of its residual claimants.”). But see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 
955 (Del. 1985) (Directors can consider the “impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., 
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)”); Paramount 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, 
Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 112 (Del. Ch. 2011) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1150) (outside a 
change of control, “a board of directors ‘is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value 
in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.’”); TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 
Nos. CIV. A. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (“[D]irectors in pursuit 
of long run corporate (and shareholder) value may be sensitive to the claims of other ‘corporate 
constituencies.’ . . . There is a time, however, when the board’s duty becomes more targeted and 
specific and its range of options becomes narrower.”). 
144. Martin Lipton, Steve Rosenblum, and William Savitt discuss the far-reaching effects of recent 
socio-political events:  
Indeed, the codependencies and interconnectedness between stakeholder well-being and 
corporate well-being have been elucidated by the systemic shock from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
That shock has prompted not only an economic and social reset, but also a governance reset 
insofar as it has underscored the logic and benefits of ESG and stakeholder governance—not 
only in terms of reputational capital, but also in terms of the impact on operations, corporate 
culture, employee morale, customer and supplier relationships and other building blocks of 
corporate value. 
Lipton et al., supra note 140; Martin Wolf, How Covid-19 Will Change the World, FIN. TIMES (June 
16, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/9b8223bb-c5e4-4c11-944d-94ff5d33a909 [https://perma.cc/ 
67PQ-WJER]; Colback, supra note 104; Kathryn Dill, CEOs and Big Businesses Speak Out on 
Racism, Police Violence, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2020, 10:53 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ceos-
and-big-businesses-speak-out-on-racism-police-violence-11591050109 [https://perma.cc/EC3J-
5XMF].  
145. See Walter Frick, The Conundrum of Corporate Power, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 2018, 
https://hbr.org/2018/05/the-conundrum-of-corporate-power [https://perma.cc/44L8-8LUD].  
146. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1128–29; see also Bayless Manning, Corporate Power and 
Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and Particular Reservations, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 38, 46 
(1960). 
147. Ronald Alsop, Corporate Scandals Hit Home, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2004, 10:39 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107715182807433462 [https://perma.cc/FD73-PE4R] (discussing 
 
Simmons (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:01 PM 
964 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:935 
 
power include, inter alia, competition, profits, political intervention, and 
public consensus or sentiment.148 
Historically, proponents of federal chartering have come from both 
stakeholder and shareholder constituencies. Diverse stakeholder 
constituencies sought federal chartering to address a range of corporate 
problems, such as firm concentration, employee disempowerment, and 
corporate political activity, and to promote disclosure of economic, social, 
and environmental impacts.149 Shareholder constituencies sought it as a 
way to enhance corporate democracy and managerial accountability 
through reforms, such as cumulative voting, eliminating staggered boards, 
and nonvoting shares.150 Changes in the law to enhance shareholder voice 
over the past twenty-five years have strengthened their hand, particularly 
for institutional investors, and may have eliminated a strong base of 
support for federal chartering.151 
Although federal chartering has been proposed for more than two 
centuries, other, less intrusive methods of regulation have prevailed. 
Why? Does this historical failure dim prospects for success in the current 
climate? The short answer is yes. In the continuum of regulatory measures 
to address corporate governance (Fig. 1), self-regulation is at one end and 
complete government control at the other. Within this context, federal 
chartering for some observers is a bridge to greater government control 
and command of business enterprises, making it a less feasible political 
option.152 
 
the public’s distrust of corporations following waves of accounting scandals starting in the early 
2000s); Philip Augar, Corporate Scandals Demand a Shake-Up in the Boardroom, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 
14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/570b60b2-1ece-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229c (last visited Aug. 
27, 2021) (“In the past few years, scandal has affected many businesses in the FTSE 100, such as BP, 
BAE Systems, GlaxoSmithKline, HSBC, Tesco and Rolls-Royce, and elsewhere such as Toshiba, 
Volkswagen and Wells Fargo.”); Emily Flitter, The Price of Wells Fargo’s Fake Account Scandal 
Grows by $3 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/business/wells-fargo-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/8XME 
-WCEL] (discussing recent three billion dollar settlement by Wells Fargo following discovery of 
fraudulent employee activity from 2002 to 2016). 
148. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 52–59 (1954). 
149. Id.  
150. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1127–28.  
151. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 657–58 (2010) (explaining proponents of shareholder empowerment gained 
significant political traction after the 2008–2009 financial crisis).  
152. See generally Winter, Jr., supra note 108; infra note 186 (discussing failed federalization 
proposals). 
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2. Supply and Demand Dynamics of Corporate Reform 
A supply-and-demand paradigm in which lawmakers supply law and 
regulation to corporate constituents elucidates lawmakers’ incentives and 
how corporate constituents evaluate the efficacy of corporate reform 
services.153 This analysis helps us to predict the form regulation may take. 
The “government as order-taker” analogy is too simplistic to account for 
the complex relationship between lawmakers and corporate 
constituents.154 They exchange political capital, and the fact that it is less 
transparent than prices in other buyer/seller contexts does not undermine 
its importance.155 Among corporate constituents like managers, political 
capital is an “intangible asset that provides corporations with long term 
value extending beyond an isolated policy issue [or dispute].”156 
Similarly, lawmakers are incentivized to maximize political capital by 
generating broad political support.157 Arguments asserting that proposed 
regulation is efficient, inefficient, necessary, unnecessary, fair, or unfair 
 
153. The exchange of political capital is not as fluid as the exchange of monetary currency. In the 
typical buyer-seller scenario, for example, the buyer, in theory, may choose other goods and services 
if in a position to do so. See Simmons, supra note 22, at 328–29. 
154. See id. at 322 (quoting Sam Peltzman, George Stigler’s Contribution to the Economic Analysis 
of Regulation, 101 J. POL. ECON. 818, 828 (1993)). 
155. Id. at 329 (quoting Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2005)). 
156. Fisch, supra note 155, at 1498 (describing a case study of FedEx to illustrate the various ways 
corporations buy and use political power); see also Simmons, supra note 22, at 329.  
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must also “show what is ‘in it’ for the political actors when they move” in 
a particular direction.158 
On the surface, it seems rational for lawmakers to target the most 
lucrative consumer segment—that is, managers and institutional 
investors.159 Yet the less visible credence characteristics of corporate 
reform allow lawmakers to satisfy many constituencies simultaneously.160 
Lawmakers have “a broader set of options to address populist outrage and 
market instability,”161 which is salient because the perception of the 
corporation as a quasi-public institution has elevated the status of public 
opinion in the contemporary corporate governance discussion. 
Even though the public opinion concept is imprecise, ascertaining 
general public sentiment is an informative exercise for boards, executives, 
and lawmakers alike. Public opinion functions as a crude measure of 
public legitimacy for corporate governance.162 It tends to be cyclical and 
intense.163 But it does not always “spring immaculately or automatically 
into people’s minds”; it may be partially manufactured.164 In and of 
themselves, citizen demands may not have a significant impact on 
corporate conduct, but such demands are more likely to be successful 
when coupled with lawmaker intervention or the threat thereof.165 
Politics can disrupt markets, but it also has the power to mediate 
economic turmoil. Corporate scandals, social unrest, and severe 
“economic disruptions often change the distribution of political power and 
create opportunities for public policy entrepreneurs to rearrange things to 
 
158. See Peltzman, supra note 154, at 824.  
159. Id.  
160. Simmons, supra note 22 at 330 (“Because credence characteristics make lawmaker 
motivations easier to camouflage, corporate constituents, particularly those with greater informational 
constraints, find it difficult to determine clear winners and losers. By the time these corporate 
constituents discern the impact of a particular regulation, public outrage has waned, only to reappear 
in the future.”). 
161. See id.; MEN-ANDRI BENZ, STRATEGIES IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE AND CREDENCE 
GOODS 53 (2007). 
162. As Adolf Berle asserts, “a modern American corporation understands well enough that it has 
a ‘constituency’ to deal with. If its constituents—notably its buyers—are unsatisfied, they will go to 
the political state for solution. Hardly any present-day board of directors or corporation management 
would take the position that it could afford to disregard public opinion—or would last very long if it 
did.” BERLE, supra note 148, at 56. 
163. Id. at 57 (“A disadvantage (not peculiar perhaps to a political as contrasted with an economic 
balancing force) is the fact that movements of public opinion tend to be sluggish in commencing, and 
extreme once they start. A situation has to be really out of hand before public pressure begins to assert 
itself, and when it does passions run high.”). 
164. MURRAY EDELMAN, THE POLITICS OF MISINFORMATION 53 (2001). 
165. Mark Roe’s description of “backlash” acknowledges the importance of broader public 
sentiment beyond the manager-shareholder constituency. See Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 217, 217 (1998); Simmons, supra note 22, at 331.  
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their advantage.”166 Diffuse constituencies, despite lacking organization, 
may nonetheless participate in the political process when they are 
provided with “free (and easy to digest, perhaps entertaining) 
information” and “political saliency, a major national issue that 
commands attention and motivates action in the absence of political 
organization.”167 The influence of social media has amplified this effect. 
The present political moment is ripe for policy entrepreneurs. “For 
lawmakers, the pragmatic outcome to this scenario is a compromise 
among various interests, albeit slanted to preserve a broad coalition of 
support, thereby maximizing lawmaker utility.”168 Therefore, “the 
corporate regulatory framework . . . is laden with policies that seem 
economically inefficient and resemble a placebo rather than a cure.” 
Meanwhile “[e]fficient [or fair] regulation may lack political appeal, and 
at times, merely symbolic or inefficient policies have more political 
utility.”169 To limit the backlash generated by economic shocks, scandals, 
and social unrest, seemingly “inefficient legal structures may arise and 
survive, despite the fact that they could not withstand a normal efficiency 
[or fairness] critique.”170 Strategic inefficiency, on balance, may be a net 
positive. Its political value is not diminished by the fact that the amount 
of political backlash averted from corporate entities or the necessary 
amount of political accommodation cannot be measured with any degree 
of precision.171 Lawmakers’ pursuit of self-interest and maximization of 
political utility may actually benefit shareholder and stakeholder 
constituencies.172 From this perspective, reform outcomes in practice are 
not simply zero sum, but can include win-win and lose-lose scenarios 
among multiple stakeholders. 
 
166. SAM PELTZMAN, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION AFTER A DECADE OF 
DEREGULATION, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 58 (William 
C. Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1989).  
167. Id. at 51–52.  
168. Simmons, supra note 22, at 323.  
169. Id. 
170. See Roe, supra note 165, at 217 (1998) (“The prospect of backlash—or of strategically 
tempering otherwise efficient rules and institutions to finesse away a more destructive backlash—
complicates a law and economics inquiry.”). 
171. See id. at 240.  
172. See id. at 238 n.40 (expressing doubt over whether executive compensation fits this pattern 
because excessive CEO pay might simply be an agency cost, not a necessary feature to firm 
productivity). 
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III. FEDERAL CHARTERING PROPOSALS 
A. The Nader Group Report of 1976 
Whereas Winter and Cary dominated the academic debate regarding 
charter competition in the 1970s, Ralph Nader and his co‐authors Mark 
Green and Joel Seligman brought chartering proposals into the 
mainstream political discussion. Their 1976 report, Constitutionalizing 
the Corporation: The Case for Federal Chartering of Giant 
Corporations,173 cited a range of justifications, including: (1) costly 
market and nonmarket impacts;174 (2) oligopolistic company behaviors 
negatively affecting consumers;175 (3) externalities, such as 
environmental pollution;176 (4) claims that Delaware had sold its law to 
the largest corporations in exchange for substantial franchise fees;177 
(5) insubstantial corporate statutes; and (6) the oligarchic rather than 
democratic features of large company governance.178 Admittedly, 
proponents knew that addressing these problems would require not just 
federal chartering, but a robust and prescriptive chartering statute 
containing a variety of provisions to influence the internal governance of 
large corporations.179 The Nader group proposal had four substantive 
sections targeting corporate governance, disclosure, corporate monopoly, 
and an Employee Bill of Rights.180 It would apply to corporations with 
 
173. Simmons, supra note 22, at 365; Robert M. Smith, Nader Group Urges the Federal 
Chartering of Big Corporations, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1976), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/01/25/archives/nader-group-urges-the-federal-chartering-of-big-
corporations-five.html [https://perma.cc/NR9Y-2NE6]; Ralph Nader & Mark Green, Corporate 
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 1979), https://www.nytimes.com/1979/12/28/archives/corporate-
democracy.html [https://perma.cc/FAC4-C5A6]. 
174. Smith, supra note 173 (“Because our largest corporations have such costly market and non-
market impacts, large companies are ‘effectively private governments huge oligopolies [that] 




177. Id. (“Because the present chartering system has failed. ‘Delaware, in cornering the charter 
market, has effectively sold its law in order to charter the largest corporations and to reap substantial 
franchise fees.’”). 
178. Id. (“Because the management of large companies more closely ‘resembles an oligarchy than 
a democracy,’ since in practice the major executives of the companies control the boards of directors 
rather than the reverse. The report quotes Prof. Bayless Manning, a noted student of corporate law, 
who said: ‘We have nothing left but our great empty corporation statutes—towering skyscrapers 
internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.’”). 
179. Id.; see Nader & Green, supra note 173.  
180. NADER ET AL., supra note 3, at 86–326. Nader and other federal chartering proponents also 
hoped that their federal chartering proposal would become part of the democratic party platform in 
an election year. Id. 
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U.S. revenues more than $250,000,000 “in any one of the previous three 
years, or employ[ing] more than 10,000 persons in the United States in 
any one of the previous three years and, in either case, . . . listed on a 
national securities exchange or held of record at least 2,000 American 
shareholders.”181 
One feature was a full-time, independent board to monitor the 
corporation.182 It required nine directors, each representing a particular 
constituency: employee welfare, consumer protection, environmental 
protection and community relations, shareholder rights, compliance with 
law, profits and financial integrity, purchasing and marketing, 
management efficiency, and planning and research.183 The proposal went 
beyond enhanced financial disclosures to include social impact-related 
disclosures.184 The Employee Bill of Rights called for free speech, 
privacy, and discrimination protections,185 and the corporate monopoly 
sections sought to discourage future concentrations and undo existing 
concentrations by means that included divestiture.186 
Ralph Nader was skeptical of both corporations and government. He 
promoted the concept of public citizens, or “people who devote all or 
substantially all of their time to public interest activities.”187 They operate 
as a third way to constrain large corporations. Public citizens are often 
public-interest lawyers who function as private attorneys-general, pushing 
government to hold corporations accountable by imposing sanctions and 
 
181. Id. at 391. 
182. Id. at 86–214. 
183. Id.  
184. Id. at 215–99. 
185. See id. at 321. 
186. Id. at 384–89. On April 2, 1980, the Corporate Democracy Act was introduced in the U.S. 
House of Representatives. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong. (1980). It did not propose a federal chartering 
mechanism and followed a federal minimum standards approach closer to that advocated by William 
Cary. See id. Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal (D-NY) was the primary sponsor. Id. There were 
seven co-sponsors: Frank Thompson Jr. (D-NJ); Ted Weiss (D-NY); Robert Kastenmeier [D-WI]; 
John Conyers Jr. (D-MI); Charles Rangel (D-NY); William Clay (D-MO); Don Edwards (D-CA). Id. 
It was read and then assigned to three committees: Commerce, Judiciary, and Education & Labor, but 
no actions were taken in any committee. Id. That same year, on April 16, 1980, another corporate 
reform bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate: the Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980. 
S. 2567, 96th Cong. (1980); see also Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980: Hearing on 
S. 2567 Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 96th Cong. 
39–53 (1980) (statement of Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Masur, Professor of Law, Yale University) 
(testifying to the challenges of federal chartering). This bill did not contain a federal chartering option 
but did follow an approach more akin to William Cary’s federal minimum standards. See S. 2567. 
Similar to the Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, the bill did not advance in committee and was never 
enacted. See S.2567 - Protection of Shareholders Rights Act of 1980, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/senate-bill/2567/actions?r=18&s=1 (last visited Sept. 
23, 2021). 
187. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 73. 
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prohibitions that a government agency might be reluctant to address.188 
Unlike other approaches, the public-citizen concept shows little deference 
to, or faith in, government actors. Instead, it recognizes that government 
and its regulations may actually strengthen the hand of large corporations. 
Nader, in essence, proposed tools for self-help and protection in the public 
interest.189 
B. The Warren Plan (The Accountable Capitalism Act of 2018) 
On August 15, 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren introduced the 
Accountable Capitalism Act (S. 3348) (ACA),190 which mandates federal 
chartering.191 Some of its ideas originated with the Nader Group.192 Its 
proposed federal chartering regime is intended to limit state law—that is, 
Delaware’s influence—regulating the internal affairs of large, powerful 
corporations; all companies, public and private, with $1 billion in 
revenues would have to secure a federal charter.193 To an extent, its 
provisions resemble the benefit-corporation statutes that proliferate in 
over thirty states, requiring management to consider and balance 
stakeholder and financial concerns.194 In these other state jurisdictions, 
promoters, investors, and managers can choose benefit-corporation status 
among a range of entity options. However, under the ACA, a benefit 
corporation-like federal charter is mandatory for certain large 
corporations.195 Additional provisions under the ACA would give workers 
a greater voice in corporate management; allow employees to elect at least 
40% of corporate directors; require 75% of directors and shareholders to 
approve political expenditures; and prohibit directors and officers from 
selling company shares within five years of receiving them or within three 
years of a company buyback.196 The bill was introduced, referred to 
committee, and no further action was taken. Coincidentally (or not), it was 
introduced in advance of a presidential election. 
 
188. Id. 
189. Id.  
190. S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). 
191. Id.; see also Letter from Cornell Univ. L. Sch. to Sen. Elizabeth Warren (Aug. 15, 2018). 
192. See generally Smith, supra note 173. 
193. Elizabeth Warren, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 14, 2018, 7:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-only-
to-shareholders-1534287687 [https://perma.cc/UXA7-A43B]. 
194. Compare S. 3348, with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2020), and CAL. CORP. CODE 
§§ 14600–14631 (2019). 
195. S. 3348 § 4. 
196. Id.; see also Letter from Cornell Univ. L. Sch. to Sen. Elizabeth Warren, supra note 191. 
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C. The Sanders Plan (Corporate Accountability and Democracy Plan) 
Senator Bernie Sanders’s “Corporate Accountability and Democracy” 
plan includes a federal charter mandate for U.S. corporations with over 
$100 million in annual revenue, at least $100 million in balance-sheet 
total, and all publicly traded companies.197 This threshold is much lower 
than that of the Warren Plan.198 The Sanders plan requires boards to 
“consider the interests of all of the stakeholders in a company—including 
workers, customers, shareholders, and the communities in which the 
corporation operates.”199 In addition to federal chartering, it seeks a range 
of measures to strengthen workers’ power, including greater and more 
diverse employee representation on boards200; wealth-sharing with 
employees; promoting employee ownership of corporate enterprises; and 
banning stock buybacks. The plan is explicit in its attempt to shift the 
corporate balance of power away from managers and large shareholders 
toward workers and other stakeholders.201 
IV. THE EFFICACY OF FEDERAL CHARTERING VERSUS 
DELAWARE’S DE FACTO AGENCY STATUS 
Contemporary federal chartering proposals are strikingly similar. They 
rest on a perception that federalism—cooperation between the federal 
government and the states—has failed to create legal standards that hold 
managers sufficiently accountable to the corporations’ constituencies.202 
They commonly address business concentration; strengthening the voice 
of shareholders through a range of governance mechanisms; promoting a 
broader stakeholder view of corporate governance, including, inter alia, 
mandating that managers balance the interests of corporate constituents, 
 
197. Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmüeller, Taming the Corporate Leviathan: Codetermination 
and the Democratic State 10–11 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper, Paper No. 536, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3680769 [https://perma.cc/VTJ5-ZN4L]. 
198. See id. at 11 (“The Sanders proposal would cover all 3,437 public-traded corporations that 
were headquartered in the United States and included in the CRSP/Compustat Merged database for 
the year 2019, the most recent year for which data are available. By contrast, the Warren proposal 
would only extend to 1,235 entities, even though it also covers limited liability companies . . . .”). 
199. Sanders, supra note 5. 
200. See Dammann & Eidenmüeller, supra note 197, at 12 (“Under Senator Warren’s Accountable 
Capitalism Act, employees would elect 40% of all corporate directors. The Sanders proposal calls for 
employees to choose 45% of all corporate directors.”). 
201. Senator Sanders sponsored similar, though less expansive, legislation in 2019, which required 
employers who ordered the closing of a plant or facility to offer its employees an opportunity to 
purchase the closing facility through an employee stock-ownership plan or an eligible worker-owned 
cooperative. The bill was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, but no 
further action was taken. See S. 1661, 116th Cong. (2019). 
202. See generally Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459 (1938).  
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especially stakeholders; making provision for shareholders to advance the 
social aims of the corporation through derivative litigation; allowing 
private enforcement—private actions brought by non-shareholder 
constituencies—rather than relying on public enforcement agencies that 
may be “unwilling or simply too overburdened to do their job”;203 
expanding employee rights and representation in governance;204 creating 
more democratic governance procedures within the corporation; and 
providing enhanced disclosures related to stakeholder impacts.205 These 
goals aim to check managerial power and increase managerial sensitivity 
to stakeholders’ concerns. 
Federal charter statutes akin to contemporary proposals like the Warren 
plan would unquestionably be disruptive. They would consistently apply 
one-size-fits-all federal standards to many large corporations. Their 
prescriptive approach diverges from the Delaware state law’s enabling 
framework and from traditional spheres of state and federal influence (i.e., 
internal and external affairs).206 At the extreme, they might completely 
undermine and displace Delaware’s de facto agency status in regulating 
the internal affairs of large corporate enterprises. Corporate litigation 
might migrate from Delaware state courts, which have a well-established 
track record of resolving disputes between large, publicly traded 
companies, and move to federal district courts. Moreover, Delaware’s 
economy and, to a lesser extent, other states’ economies, would suffer a 
significant loss of franchise fees, especially from large, highly capitalized 
companies. Without them, Delaware and other states, via their 
legislatures, might lose incentives for long-term investment in state court 
systems. 
A. Implementation and Logistical Challenges 
Federal chartering proponents often envision a dual system: companies 
would incorporate in a state, but certain large companies would also be 
required to secure a federal charter. This approach could capture both 
large, private and listed companies, and federal corporate law would likely 
preempt state law. Recognizing implementation challenges, federal 
chartering proposals, such as the Nader Group Plan and the Warren Plan, 
suggested that Congress focus on immediate legislation addressing 
 
203. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1142. 
204. Dammann & Eidenmüeller, supra note 197, at 12 (“Under Senator Warren’s Accountable 
Capitalism Act, employees would elect 40% of all corporate directors.”). 
205. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1142–43. 
206. E. Norman Veasey, What Would Madison Think? The Irony of the Twists and Turns of 
Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 43 (2009). 
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corporate power rather than drafting a comprehensive corporate code. 
Under the Warren Plan, companies must comply or face serious 
penalties or sanctions, including, but not limited to, charter revocation.207 
A mandatory federal charter with the possibility of revocation is a harsh 
remedy with wide-ranging implications affecting customers, suppliers, 
and workers as well as management. Some type of pilot program 
involving a trial or control group of corporations may be necessary to test 
the plan’s impact before wholesale implementation. Some companies may 
want the option to revert or reincorporate in another jurisdiction. 
Contemporary federal chartering proposals envision a new federal 
apparatus to oversee chartering and enforcement. For example, the 
Warren Plan envisions the creation of an Office of U.S. Corporations, with 
the U.S. Department of Commerce and other agencies, particularly federal 
courts and the SEC, contributing to its enforcement.208 Yet the 
enforcement details and dynamics of a stakeholder-influenced governance 
regime remain unclear under contemporary federal chartering proposals. 
Additionally, the Warren Plan’s skeletal provisions leave open many 
questions regarding complexity, coordination, bureaucracy, and 
implementation. For example, would shareholders bring actions on behalf 
of stakeholder constituencies? Would stakeholders have the standing to 
bring private actions? Or both? Any law that would broaden the horizons 
of corporate law would require significant study and deliberation by a 
diverse set of represented interests. Through a special task force or acting 
through its committees, Congress could synthesize competing views and 
make recommendations.209 
B. Politicization of the Internal Corporate Structure 
Corporate influence undeniably raises political considerations for 
many constituencies and interests.210 Federal chartering proposals raise 
difficult questions about how broadly or narrowly to conceive a 
corporation’s constituency and accountability. A long-standing critique of 
stakeholder governance has been the potential politicization of the internal 
corporation (e.g., board composition) and resulting costs to shareholders. 
Compared to internally focused corporate law reforms, externally 
imposed stakeholder driven business regulations (e.g., environmental and 
labor regulation) receive less pushback and are viewed as the cost of doing 
 
207. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 9 (2018). 
208. Id. § 3. 
209. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1159. 
210. Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1537–39 (2018). 
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business.211  
No formula can precisely calculate how corporations factor their many, 
diverse stakeholder interests into firm governance. Their investor base is 
diverse even before stakeholder interests are added to the mix. However, 
the idea that focusing on diverse stakeholder interests will undermine 
shareholder interests is too simplistic. In some situations, yes, but on 
certain issues, their interests may converge. Millions of investors hold 
retirement accounts. They have an interest in stock returns as well as 
sustainable corporate practices that have long-term social, political, and 
economic impact on their quality of life.212 To some observers, the market 
is the neutral, apolitical, measurable, and rational arbiter. Even if it is 
imperfect, speculative, and sometimes trendy, the singular goal of 
maintaining stockholder primacy seems more workable to them than 
accommodating wide-ranging stakeholder interests and vacillating 
political behavior. The lines between long term shareholder wealth 
maximization and broader stakeholder concerns are often blurred. Rigid 
attachment to a singular goal of profit maximization, no matter how 
imprecise, ignores the need for greater flexibility and hybridization to 
meet the demands of the contemporary context. 
C. Adversarial Versus Cooperative 
Federal chartering legislation assumes that cooperative federalism in 
the area of corporate governance is a failed experiment. Yet the absence 
of federal chartering does not preclude stakeholder influence through 
other mechanisms. From a political standpoint, decoupling the federal 
chartering option from other federal stakeholder-oriented measures may 
be (and has been) strategically useful for stakeholder advocates, especially 
given concerns about implementation and the paucity of evidence that 
federal chartering and federal adjudication will yield improved, if not 
mixed, results. Federal chartering is only one of many ways to influence 
corporate governance.213 A fair assessment of the interplay between 
Delaware and the federal government requires acknowledging the 
 
211. See generally Edward Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The Debate 
over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. 363 (2021) (“The public law aspects of corporate law . . . are 
primarily the domain of federal securities regulation. Investor protection, mandatory disclosure, board 
structure, regulation of material nonpublic information, and many other aspects of publicly traded 
corporations are regulated by, or under the supervision of, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission.”); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.4 (1986) (distinguishing between 
traditional corporate law and other laws affecting corporations). 
212. Leo E. Strine Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism 20–22 (Univ. Pa. Inst. for L. & 
Econ., Research Paper No. 19-39, 2019).  
213. See Birdzell, Jr., supra note 14, at 318. 
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possibility that it may yield benefits in the corporate governance arena.214 
With its enabling approach, Delaware may be able to respond to 
innovations with more nuance, whereas at the federal level, a one-size-
fits-all approach with prescriptive rules might prevail. Even if the current 
federal-state regulatory framework is insufficient, it can be amended to 
better address concerns of multiple stakeholders. 
D. Additional Concerns 
Finally, the socio-political context in which modern federal chartering 
reform proposals operate is important for determining their efficacy. An 
interesting and related question is whether the argument for federal 
chartering is supported by today’s legal, political, and business 
environment. 
1. Proliferation of Social Enterprise Statutes 
The present availability of social enterprise statutes in most U.S. 
jurisdictions may either undercut or support arguments in favor of 
mandatory federal chartering. States have created social enterprises, such 
as public benefit corporations in Delaware, to better address stakeholder 
concerns.215 Some states have adopted a benefit corporation statute that 
resembles the model statute created by B Lab, a nonprofit corporation that 
has been instrumental in promoting benefit-corporation statutes 
nationwide and provides B-Corp certifications.216 Other states like 
Delaware and Colorado have adopted benefit-corporation statutes that call 
for the consideration of stakeholder issues but still preserve a more 
shareholder-centric enabling framework.217 
 
214. Compare Robert B. Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism 
for Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 295–96 (2009) (“There are . . . potential 
gains from federal [corporate] law . . . including the likely higher level of expertise that would arise 
from a pooling of resources.”), with Lawrence A. Cunningham, The New Federal Corporate Law?, 
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 692 (2009) (“If the portion of corporation law addressing primarily 
managers and shareholders were produced in Washington, [then constituencies lobbying for imposing 
laws on corporations through antitrust, bankruptcy, labor, tax, and environmental law] would come 
into direct play and into more direct political conflict.”). 
215. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 17, at 354–55. 
216. A benefit corporation is an actual type of chartered entity, meanwhile a B-Corp is a 
certification issued by B-Lab to an existing entity. About B Lab, B LAB, 
https://bcorporation.net/about-b-lab [https://perma.cc/T74R-QFD9]; see also Simmons, supra note 
17.  
217. Simmons, supra note 17; see also Robert G. Eccles, Leo E. Strine & Timothy Youmans, 3 
Ways to Put Your Corporate Purpose into Action, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 13, 2020), 
https://hbr.org/2020/05/3-ways-to-put-your-corporate-purpose-into-action [https://perma.cc/97ZC-
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Against this backdrop of state experimentation, a mandatory federal 
chartering regime seems superfluous, especially when Delaware and other 
jurisdictions already offer a menu of options to socially-minded 
enterprises. States implemented these stakeholder-oriented statutes in 
response to investor appetites and perhaps in fear of federal preemption 
or more intrusive regulation. Their proliferation can be characterized as a 
form of democratic experimentalism, where states serve as laboratories to 
identify better practices and determine a scalable model for 
multijurisdictional or national implementation.218 As yet, states’ 
experiences with social enterprises, particularly benefit corporations, 
remain nascent.219 Arguably, more time and data are needed to observe 
their operation and the litigation surrounding them. In theory, the study of 
state experiences with benefit corporations might strengthen the case for 
future federal chartering proposals. 
2. Rise of Impact Investing and ESG Factors 
The rise of impact investing with an environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) emphasis leverages nonregulatory means—for 
example, shareholder voice—to influence corporate practices and 
 
5PHA] (“If the Business Roundtable supports conversion of their public companies to this model, 
their mere ‘trust us, we care’ words will become those of accountable leaders who embrace an 
enforceable obligation to others. But corporate leaders cannot succeed unless institutional investors, 
such as BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, and Vanguard, and organizations like the Council of 
Institutional Investors also walk their talk on corporate purpose and on the value of stakeholders. 
These and other large investors have demonstrated that their voting clout can move the market. If they 
support public companies in converting to benefit corporation status, our corporate governance 
system can change for the better—fast.”). 
218. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[A] 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”). Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel expound this idea in 
creating a new form of governance called “democratic experimentalism” where “power is 
decentralized to enable citizens and other actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to 
their individual circumstances, but in which regional and national coordinating bodies require actors 
to share their knowledge with others facing similar problems.” Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, 
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998); see also Jody 
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14 (1997) 
(discussing the use of “collaborative governance” where failure and experimentalism is embraced). 
219. While no Fortune 500 companies have yet reincorporated under Public Benefit Corporation 
(PBC) statutes, younger companies have adopted a benefit governance system. See Frederick 
Alexander, Real Change in Real Time: Benefit Corporations See New Interest, B THE CHANGE: 
S’HOLDER COMMONS (July 14, 2020), https://bthechange.com/real-change-in-real-time-benefit-
corporations-see-new-interest-82918ba14048 [https://perma.cc/8ZZ4-9NDQ] (“[T]he shareholders 
of publicly traded Amalgamated Bank recently approved benefit governance at their annual meeting. 
Lemonade, an innovative insurance broker backed by SoftBank, Sequoia and other venture capital 
funds, completed the most successful IPO of 2020, rising 139% on its first day of trading (after pricing 
above the underwriters’ range).”). 
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policies. Institutional investors held only 6% of the U.S. equity market in 
1950 and 37% by 1980.220 Today, they hold an estimated 80%.221 
Observers contend that the movement for ESG investing originates from 
the UN Principles for Responsible Investment issued in 2004 under the 
leadership of Secretary Kofi Annan. Approximately two-thousand money 
managers signed on to the principles, including BlackRock, the Vanguard 
Group, UBS Group, State Street Global Advisors, and Fidelity.222 The 
appetite and preference for impact investing continue to grow. It is 
especially popular among two large demographic groups: millennials 
(86%) and women (84%).223 Millennials represent a potential $12-$30 
trillion in future wealth assets.224 To put that number into perspective, the 
S&P 500 today accounts for $20 trillion.225 
Impact investing reflects some convergence between shareholder and 
stakeholder interests but falls short of perfect alignment given the need to 
balance financial return with social impact and inevitable intertemporal 
 
220. See JANICE M. TRAFLET, A NATION OF SMALL SHAREHOLDERS: MARKETING WALL STREET 
AFTER WORLD WAR II 174, tbl.E.3 (2013) (chronicling the New York Stock Exchange’s efforts to 
broaden the country’s shareholder base during the Cold War); Brian Reid, The 1990s: A Decade of 
Expansion and Change in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, INV. CO. INST. PERSP., July 2000, at 1, 15 
(explaining institutional investor equity ownership). 
221. See Charles McGrath, 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS & INVS. 
(Apr. 25, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/ 
170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions [https://perma.cc/V53V-8LXD] (analyzing 
institutional ownership of companies).  
222. These are the five largest investment management companies worldwide, together managing 
over $22 trillion dollars. Tim Lemke, The 10 Largest Investment Management Companies Worldwide, 
THE BALANCE (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.thebalance.com/which-firms-have-the-most-assets-
under-management-4173923 [https://perma.cc/6EE8-3KB7]; Signatory Directory, PRINCIPLES FOR 
RESPONSIBLE INV., https://www.unpri.org/signatories/signatory-resources/signatory-directory [https 
://perma.cc/4BH9-MWR8].  
223. MORGAN STANLEY INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE INVESTING, SUSTAINABILITY SIGNALS 4, 8 
(2017), https://www.morganstanley.com/pub/content/dam/msdotcom/ideas/sustainable-signals/pdf/ 
Sustainable_Signals_Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SCZ-DDXB]. 
224. See Pippa Stevens, Your Complete Guide to Investing with a Conscience, a $30 Trillion 
Market Just Getting Started, CNBC (Dec. 16, 2019, 9:54 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/14/ 
your-complete-guide-to-socially-responsible-investing.html [https://perma.cc/MR37-97EZ] (“More 
than 2,250 money managers who collectively oversee $80 trillion in assets have now signed on to the 
United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investment.”); see also Steve Chiavarone, This Is 
How Millennials Are Shaping the New Economy, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2019, 4:13 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/02/this-is-how-millennials-are-shaping-the-new-economy.html 
[https://perma.cc/H69P-7U8G?type=image] (“According to Morgan Stanley, 84% of millennials cite 
investing with a focus on ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) impact as a central goal.”); 
Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism 
and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243 (2020).  
225. Yashaswini Swamynathan, The S&P 500 Is Worth $20 Trillion for the First Time, BUS. 
INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2017, 6:42 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/sp-500-market-cap-crosses-20-
trillion-for-the-first-time-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/P6LF-NRJW?type=image]. 
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choices and trade-offs.226 Compared to federal chartering, it remains a less 
intrusive, stakeholder-influenced mechanism that falls within the market 
paradigm. 
Decisions pertaining to ESG do not differ much from other decisions 
subject to the business judgment rule, provided some impact on, or link 
to, long-term value can be identified.227 Such decisions “might include 
how corporations respond to climate change, how good they are with 
water management, implementing effective health and safety policies to 
protect against accidents, managing supply chains, [and] how they treat 
their workers.”228 
Some skepticism attaches to ESG efforts. A common critique is that 
they may reduce shareholder profits and limit director accountability.229 
Evidence of long-term value-performance gains would bolster and 
insulate most ESG-related decisions from challenge. In any case, some 
ESG proponents question whether money alone should be the driving 
force and want to shift from a financially motivated system of shareholder 
 
226. See Robert J. Rhee, Corporate Short-Termism and Intertemporal Choice, 96 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 495, 507 (2018) (“Short-termism is sometimes characterized in broad brush strokes as the bane 
of corporate governance, creating a misleading impression that elevates long-term strategies as 
aspirational and short-term choices as suboptimal. Such characterization is too simplistic and 
misleading . . . . Managers routinely make intertemporal cost-benefit choices.”); see also TIM 
KOLLER, MARC GOEDHART & DAVID WESSELS, VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE 
VALUE OF COMPANIES 13 (6th ed. 2015) (noting the tradeoffs managers make between short-term 
profit and long-term value). While the interest of shareholders and stakeholders do not align perfectly, 
there has been some recent evidence suggesting the adoption of ESG standards has largely been driven 
by shareholders and proxy advisory firms. Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business 
Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 IOWA J. CORP. L. 647, 679-81 (2016); Robert G. Eccles 
& Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 2019, at 106, 
https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution [https://perma.cc/5NBF-49M4].  
227. CLARK, supra note 26, § 3.4 (“[T]he business judgment of the directors will not be challenged 
or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors will not be held liable for the consequences 
of their exercise of business judgment—even for judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes—
unless certain exceptions apply.”); see also FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 290 (3d ed. 
2000) (“The idea underlying the rule is that courts should exercise restraint in holding directors liable 
for . . . business decisions which produce poor results or with which reasonable minds might disagree. 
This seems to be a sensible notion. After all, business decisions typically involve taking calculated 
risks.”).  
228. Omari Scott Simmons, Chancery’s Greatest Decision: Historical Insights on Civil Rights and 
the Future of Shareholder Activism, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259, 1291 (2019) (quoting Georg Kell, 
The Remarkable Rise of ESG (July 11, 2018, 10:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/20
18/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-of-esg/?sh=62ae7cab1695 [https://perma.cc/WJW3-4TZC]).  
229. Gillian Tett, Why ESG Investing Makes Fund Managers More Money, FIN. TIMES (July 8, 
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/1cfb5e02-7ce1-4020-9c7c-624a3dd6ead9 [https://perma.cc/4NL 
V-HHAM]; see also Feifei Li & Katrina Sherrerd, Unlocking the Performance Potential in ESG 
Investing, RSCH. AFFILIATES (Mar. 2018) https://www.researchaffiliates.com/en_us/publications/art
icles/659-unlocking-the-performance-potential-in-esg-investing.html [https://perma.cc/6P5G-
QX4C] (explaining that empirical studies are inconclusive as to whether ESG actually impacts short-
term value, but preliminary long-run evidence indicates value gain).  
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primacy to a broader, social-good, stakeholder-based system. 
Critics also contend that the present narrative “greenwashes” or 
exaggerates commitment to environmental and social issues. They note 
the discrepancy between stated goals and their achievement and the lack 
of standard criteria to measure ESG effectiveness.230 New measurement 
and data collection tools are emerging.231 However, a looming question 
remains concerning the extent to which institutional investors will enforce 
company specific ESG goals. 
3. Evolving Expectations for Corporate Managers 
Today’s directors are more professional, skilled, and effective than 
their predecessors, but their progress does not undermine arguments for 
federal chartering. From Allis-Chalmers232 to Caremark233 and to the 
present, expectations for how directors should carry out their oversight 
duties and general workload are evolving.234 These changes reflect the 
 
230. Stefanie Perrella, Julianne Recine & John Ward, ESG and Private Funds, BLOOMBERG L. 2 
(2020), https://www.duffandphelps.com/-/media/assets/pdfs/news/esg-private-funds.pdf?la=en&has 
h=143DF4900047286846C0CD0B2E2A2A9BB54F5D8A [https://perma.cc/P7YH-GDYT].  
231. See, e.g., Lorie Konish, Morgan Stanley Launches New Tool to Let Advisors, Investors 
Measure Sustainable Investing  Goals, CNBC (July 29, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/20
19/07/29/morgan-stanley-offers-new-tool-to-let-advisors-measure-esg-
goals.html#:~:text=Morgan%20Stanley%20is%20offering%20a,Quotient%2C%20was%20announc
ed%20on%20Monday [https://perma.cc/GE8C-2GHR]; Measuring the Immeasurable: Scoring ESG 
Factors, GOLDMAN SACHS, https://www.gsam.com/content/gsam/global/en/market-insights/gsam-
insights/gsam-perspectives/2015/esg/qis-article.html [https://perma.cc/XD4J-X6QJ]. 
232. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
233. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
234. Compare Allis‐Chalmers, 188 A.2d at 130 (“On the contrary, it appears that directors are 
entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them 
on suspicion that something is wrong. If such occurs and goes unheeded, then liability of the directors 
might well follow, but absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and 
operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect 
exists.”), with In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (“[A] director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt 
in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system . . . exists, and that failure to 
do so . . . may . . . render a director liable for losses incurred by non‐compliance with applicable legal 
standards.”), and Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 821 (Del. 2019) (“As with any other 
disinterested business judgment, directors have great discretion to design context- and industry-
specific approaches, . . . [but] Caremark does have a bottom-line requirement that is important: the 
board must make a good faith effort—i.e., try—to put in place a reasonable board-level system of 
monitoring and reporting.”). See E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance 
and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 444, 446 (2003) (“[M]y 
personal view is that the expectations of directors . . . progressed in the thirty-plus years from Allis-
Chalmers to Caremark.”); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in 
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance From 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key 
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1436 (2005) (describing changes to standards of director 
conduct under state law as “evolving expectations.”); see also E. Norman Veasey, Counseling 
Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59 BUS. LAW. 1447, 1451 (2004).  
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interplay of federal and state law and illustrate how the federal 
government’s regulation in a particular area can lead to or influence the 
development of law in Delaware. The Caremark decision, recognizing a 
duty to implement a system of controls, was made in the broader context 
of federal sentencing guidelines and increased federal guidance on 
accounting and other corporate control systems.235 
Directors are expected to play a prominent role in decision-making and 
monitoring. They must dedicate more time; participate in audit, 
compliance, nominating, and compensation committees; follow more 
procedures; and reflect greater expertise and competencies than ever 
before.236 The number of corporate disclosures and the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts reflect increased federal 
encroachment and greater willingness to regulate the internal affairs of 
U.S. corporations. 
These changes inform contemporary boardroom dynamics. Under an 
array of reforms and the influence of activist institutional investors,237 
directors use formal and informal mechanisms to ascertain the sentiments 
of their investor base and to avoid conflict where possible (e.g., director 
no-votes and litigation).238 
4. Risk of Capital Migration 
Federal chartering raises the risk that companies and capital will 
migrate to foreign jurisdictions. Delaware law and adjudication form an 
important part of the U.S. corporate governance system to which firms 
subscribe. The Delaware brand is world-renowned and from a global 
standpoint, enhances rather than diminishes the national reputation. It 
encourages, rather than discourages, foreign investment. From an investor 
and management standpoint, Delaware’s predictability, political stability, 
and certainty are cherished virtues for business planning. To the extent 
that investment decisions are influenced by the legal environment, 
Delaware, as de facto regulator and forum for dispute settlement, is part 
of the U.S. legal environment.239 Within this context, Delaware seems 
more of an asset than a liability. 
 
235. Veasey & Guglielmo, supra note 234, at 1436–37.  
236. See Jay W. Lorsch, Understanding Boards of Directors: A Systems Perspective, in 2 ANNALS 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (Douglas Cumming & Geoffrey Wood eds., 2017).  
237. Lin, supra note 210, at 1597–98.  
238. Lisa M. Fairfax, Government Governance and the Need to Reconcile Government Regulation 
with Board Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1692, 1710–11 (2011).  
239. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 223–24; Strine, supra note 2, at 683–84; Savitt, supra note 2, 
at 586.  
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5. Political Considerations 
William Cary’s critique of Delaware’s role as de facto regulator 
stemmed, in part, from the concern that the state’s General Assembly and 
judiciary were captured and lacked the independence to render objective 
decisions in the national interest.240 Ironically, this perspective does not 
adequately address similar interest group and capture concerns that 
resonate at the federal level. It also fails to acknowledge the strong 
incentives for Delaware actors to be perceived as apolitical and how the 
mere threat of federal encroachment may serve as a check.241 The recent 
U.S. Supreme Court case, Carney v. Adams, draws attention to the 
political balancing that characterizes Delaware’s courts and the 
importance of being perceived as apolitical in its de facto regulator 
function. 
E. Special Circumstances that May Warrant Federal Chartering 
Despite asserting that federal chartering is not merited at this particular 
historical moment, this Article does not hold that it should always remain 
impermissible. In certain circumstances, more intrusive structural 
mechanisms like federal chartering may be warranted. 
1. Successful Experimentation with Social Enterprise Statutes 
Democratic experimentalism, a facet of new governance theory, may 
eventually support federal chartering.242 Under the classic state-laboratory 
argument, if benefit corporations were to grow in popularity and success, 
the states’ benefit-corporation chartering regimes might serve as a model 
for a federal approach to chartering. Such an effort would be contingent 
upon corporate constituency preferences and political support that is 
unlikely in the current environment. Additionally, extensive litigation and 
longer-term data on benefit corporations are lacking. However, initial 
 
240. See Cary, supra note 7, at 679–80. 
241. Adams v. Carney, No. CV 17-181-MPT, 2018 WL 2411219, at *2 (D. Del. May 23, 2018), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166 (3d. Cir. 2019), cert. 
granted sub nom. Carney v. Adams, __ U.S.__, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) (No. 19-309), vacated and 
remanded, Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020) (arguing that Delaware’s political 
balancing requirement should be maintained); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 
959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (finding a duty to implement a system of controls within companies 
following passage of federal sentencing guidelines).  
242. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Democratic Experimentalism (Searching for Contemp. 
Legal Thought, Working Paper No. 14-549, 2017).  
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research indicates that such companies attract significant investment.243 
The growth of benefit corporations will depend upon impact 
investment and whether impact investors migrate to them or opt for 
traditional corporate forms. To the extent that the existing corporate 
governance regime, composed of large, publicly traded corporations 
adopts ESG standards that incorporate stakeholder concerns, investors 
may not feel the need to seek out alternatives. Less support for state 
benefit corporation chartering translates as less support for federal 
chartering. From another vantagepoint, the proliferation of state benefit-
corporation statutes may obviate the need for a federal chartering system. 
Under the present system, companies can voluntarily opt-in to benefit-
corporation status, but it is not mandatory. Choice matters and the 
coexistence of benefit-corporation status among other entity types may 
better capture the preferences of promoters, managers, and investors. 
2. Significant Government Support or Bailouts 
Another instance where federal chartering might be mandated is when 
a large company receives a major benefit from the federal government, 
such as bailout funds—a loan, majority investment, or insurance.244 
Typically, a lender, investor, or insurer will want some type of return or 
premium in exchange, and the recipient company may lose some degree 
of control, be required to provide some type of assurance, or pay a 
premium. 
Generally, bailouts “are socially desirable because Congress cannot 
anticipate the contingencies that would make possible an ex ante 
insurance system that regulates behavior and charges firms in advance for 
liquidity support.”245 However, they are “intensely controversial.”246 The 
primary policy goal underlying bailouts is stopping systemic risk, but we 
have no consensus definition of what amounts to a systemic risk.247 Other 
implicated policies include fairness and limiting moral hazard and 
administrative cost. First, some observers contend that promoting fairness 
 
243. Michael B. Dorff, James Hicks & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Future or Fancy? An 
Empirical Study of Public Benefit Corporations 49 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper 
No. 495/2020, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433772 
[https://perma.cc/5H8J-LX6J].  
244. See Eccles et al., supra note 217 (suggesting companies be compelled to adopt PBC status in 
exchange for a federal bailout). 
245. Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 479, 482 (2015). 
246. Id. at 496. 
247. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 446 (2011) (“Exactly what level 
of impact is unacceptable is a variable matter; one observer might judge a risk to be systemic, another 
not.”). 
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is not a mere moral gesture but “lends legitimacy to the government 
action” and “constrain[s] government abuse and cronyism.”248 Political 
legitimacy plays an important role in the public’s acceptance of bailout 
measures,249 so their structure must be “clear and maximize political 
accountability.”250 Fairness requires “bailouts for ordinary individuals 
rather than corporations or those with political connections whenever 
possible.”251 Second, many scholars call for bailouts that limit the risk of 
moral hazard.252 The reason “bailouts can create moral hazard [is] because 
firms that expect to be bailed out will be incentivized to engage in overly 
risky behavior because the downside risk is socialized, while the upside 
is retained.”253 Third, bailouts must factor in administrative cost. 
According to one observer, the government must “choose the most 
straightforward way to inject bailout funds into the system.”254 Doing so 
may cut against the fairness rationale because “as the number of bailout 
recipients increases, the government must [likely] spend more money on 
administrative costs.”255 
Consequently, bailouts may involve circumstances where more 
intrusive structural corporate governance restrictions and guidelines in the 
form of mandatory federal chartering are warranted. Consider the bailouts 
under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) during the Great 
 
248. Anthony J. Casey, Large Corporations Did Not Need a Bailout, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (April 
14, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/04/14/large-corporations-did-not-need-a-
bailout/ [https://perma.cc/9YAG-Q27T]. 
249. Levitin, supra note 247, at 447 (“Political legitimacy is critical for ensuring that government 
responses to financial crisis are effective. Serious crises often require repeated government actions, 
and the perceived legitimacy of one governmental action affects the government’s range of actions in 
the future.”); see also Wake Forest Law Events, Sager Speaker Series with Kenneth Feinberg 
9/28/2017, YOUTUBE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pnZ8OlMx9Y [https://pe 
rma.cc/AXC4-DUTZ] (discussing the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the controversy 
surrounding bailing out banking institutions).  
250. Levitin, supra note 247, at 491.  
251. Casey, supra note 248. 
252. See Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. 
L.J. 951, 959 (1992) (“A thoughtful bailout policy must take this moral hazard problem into 
account.”); Levitin, supra note 247, at 440 (“[H]aircuts on creditors are essential for limiting 
government losses, reducing moral hazard. . . .”); Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case 
for a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1366 (2011) (“Bailouts must be linked 
with investment returns and conditions, both to cover the government’s assumption of risk and to 
mitigate moral hazard.”). But see Casey & Posner, supra note 245, at 526 (“[T]he moral hazard 
problem is partly self-correcting and largely exaggerated.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool: 
Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761, 774 (2017) (“[M]oral 
hazard does not cause systemically important firms to engage in excessively risky behavior.”).  
253. Levitin, supra note 247, at 481–82.  
254. Casey, supra note 251. 
255. Casey & Posner, supra note 245, at 532. 
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Recession.256 Under TARP, bailout relief came with executive 
compensation and corporate governance restrictions.257 Taxpayers 
ultimately received a return on their investment, yet the program was 
criticized because “while achieving a measure of short-term stability,” it 
“failed to address certain underlying issues that may wreak havoc on the 
financial sector and the broader economy in the not-too-distant future,” 
such as moral hazard and the perception of unfairness.258 Scholars have 
argued for placing corporate governance-related restrictions on 
companies receiving bailouts up front.259 A potential condition for a large 
corporation to receive bailout assistance could include federal chartering 
among other structural reforms. 
A hypothetical candidate for federal chartering might be an airline or 
other large transportation companies that provide a public service and 
receive a major government bailout, subsidy, or contract. In exchange for 
government support, the company would have to secure a federal charter 
for a particular period of time or until certain conditions attached to 
 
256. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111ST CONG., DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: TAKING 
STOCK: WHAT HAS THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM ACHIEVED? 81 (2009); Pepper 
Culpepper, America’s Bank Bailouts Worked, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2014, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/17/americas-bank-bailouts-
worked/ [https://perma.cc/J5NV-TGLE] (“The United States actually got the big details of the bailout 
right – and for this reason, American taxpayers made money on the deal: about $8-10 billion, 
excluding the non-bank parts of the bailout.”).  
257. 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(2) (“The Secretary shall require each TARP recipient to meet appropriate 
standards for executive compensation and corporate governance.”); Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock–
Salary and Options Too: The Looting of Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 484–85 (2010) 
(describing how the Department of Treasury utilized a Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg, to oversee 
all TARP participants executive compensation).  
258. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 256, at 82. The COP report explains that, although 
TARP boosted the economy, it produced negative consequences: “[a]nother [negative] consequence, 
however, was to signal to the market that, going forward, the government may step in to provide 
bailouts to certain systemically significant institutions—such as financial institutions and auto 
manufacturers—should they face the risk of failure. As a result, the market has been distorted in a 
way that could, absent responses outside of the TARP, plague the financial sector and the broader 
economy for the foreseeable future.” Id. at 85; see also Wake Forest Law Events, supra note 249. 
259. Manns, supra note 252, at 1391; see also Levitin, supra note 247, at 512 (asserting 
government bailouts should come with “control over corporate governance” which “could guarantee 
better governance without actual government involvement”); Saule T. Omarova, Why We Need a 
National Investment Authority 3–4 (Cornell Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 20-34, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3566462 [https://perma.cc/9LDS-TDR4] (asserting the need for a National 
Investment Authority which would condition emergency relief, such as a bailout, on specific changes 
to the internal operations of a company and have the ability to enforce such conditions with a “golden 
share”); Scott W. Singer, Asserting Government Control over Subcontractors, 1994 ARMY L. 11, 12 
(1994) (explaining that the Federal Acquisition Regulations contain mandatory flow-down provisions 
for all government contracts that allow the government to assert some degree of control over both the 
party they directly contract with, the prime contractor, and the subcontractors the prime contractor 
chooses to subcontract with.); id. at 12–14 (explaining flow down provisions address a range of issues 
from security to socio-economic issues). 
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government support were met. 
3. Amnesty for Corporate Entities 
Another instance when a company might be required to reincorporate 
under a federal charter would be as a condition pursuant to a government 
settlement agreement to prevent the imposition of stiffer civil and criminal 
penalties. By analogy, companies and other entities enter into 
prosecutorial agreements, consent decrees, and other settlement 
agreements with government authorities where they agree to undertake 
certain measures.260 Federal chartering could be such a measure. 
Additionally, companies might sua sponte, in the absence of an active 
investigation or settlement, secure a federal corporate charter to prevent, 
ex ante, more severe penalties in the event of a violation. For example, a 
company’s compliance program can serve as a mitigating factor under the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations.261 Here, amnesty might 
provide a potential incentive to secure a federal charter. 
V. ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL CHARTERING 
As mentioned, federal chartering stands at one end of a continuum of 
methods to regulate corporations. It requires more than simply tampering 
with the regulatory process, and the case for it is weakened by the 
availability of less radical measures, including: (A) a federal licensing 
regime; (B) a federal corporate code that almost completely displaces 
state corporate law; (C) incremental corporate legislation, such as 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank; (D) direct stakeholder 
regulation of business enterprises; (E) state benefit-corporation statutes; 
(F) market forces (e.g., labor, capital, investor activism, and reputational 
shaming); and (G) self-regulation. 
A. Federal Licensing 
Historically, there was a more robust debate pitting federal chartering 
against federal licensing approaches to regulating large corporations.262 A 
licensing regime retains state corporation law, but corporations must seek 
 
260. Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 8 (2012) (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of 
Enforcement U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).  
261. Paula Desio, An Overview of the Organizational Guidelines, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/ORGOVERVIEW. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/F73M-QU7Z].  
262. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 84–85; Horace LaFayette Wilgus, Federal License or National 
Incorporation, 3 MICH. L. REV. 264, 265–67 (1905).  
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a federal license, ostensibly fulfilling established criteria, to engage in 
interstate commerce.263 Federal chartering preempts state corporate law 
and perhaps the need for state incorporation with federal incorporation.264 
The scope of both licensing and chartering regimes could turn on the size 
of the corporation, as reflected by a range of indicators, such as revenues 
or number of employees. Licensing, like chartering, can be voluntary or 
mandatory, but to achieve far-reaching impact, either would have to be 
mandatory. 
B. Federal Corporate Code 
A comprehensive federal code for corporate law would displace state 
law that has traditionally addressed the internal affairs of corporations. In 
theory, it could operate in the absence of, or in conjunction with, a federal 
chartering regime. For example, vocal Delaware critic William Cary 
recommended a federal corporate code but not federal chartering.265 
Presently, we have no federal corporate code, but we do have “important 
federal statutes (that is, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934) addressing disclosure, insider trading, and 
periodic reporting” without generally emphasizing internal affairs.266 A 
federal code would ostensibly reflect a broader stakeholder view of 
corporate governance because “[c]ompared to Delaware, federal 
government lawmaking is more pluralistic and involves more interest 
groups reflecting populist concerns.”267 
 
263. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 84–85.  
264. It is conceivable for a company under a federal corporate chartering regime to simultaneously 
hold a state and federal charter.  
265. Cary, supra note 7, at 701–03.  
266. Simmons, supra note 22, at 328; see also Roe, supra note 24, at 2498; Salzberg v. 
Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020) (upholding federal forum selection clauses in several 
Delaware companies’ charters regarding claims under the Securities Act of 1933 even after 
acknowledging these claims are not matters of “internal affairs” but still are “internal” to the 
corporation). 
267. Simmons, supra note 22, at 327; see also Roe, supra note 24, at 2518–19. Mark Roe describes 
the broader interests implicated at the federal level:  
More goes on in Washington than wider coalition possibilities. Public-regarding policymakers 
in Washington see themselves as custodians for the overall health of the American economy; 
accordingly, they could conclude that tight managerial accountability—beyond that which even 
interests institutional investors—would be best for the economy. The Council of Economic 
Advisors influences the President, the GAO writes reports, and the SEC often proposes rules that 
managers and institutional investors dislike. Of course, we shouldn’t naïvely think that interests 
don’t influence these players too, but the interests differ from Delaware’s, and sometimes the 
public-policy players have enough slack to be able to act on their ideological preferences. 
Id. at 2503. 
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C. Incremental Corporate Legislation 
Over the past two decades, Congress and the SEC have demonstrated 
a willingness to influence the internal affairs of corporations more directly 
but not by developing a comprehensive federal corporate code that would 
completely displace Delaware law. In recent history, partial or 
incremental reforms have been used to displace or to fill gaps in Delaware 
law rather than more intrusive measures like federal corporate chartering 
or implementing a comprehensive federal corporate code. For example, 
SOX federalizes rules for the composition of a corporation’s audit 
committee, the separation of accounting and auditing services, forfeiture 
of executive pay, and prohibitions on loans to corporate executives.268 
These rules impact corporate internal affairs. Although the possibility of 
mandatory federal chartering or a comprehensive federal corporate code 
remains slim, incremental federal encroachment is a real threat to 
Delaware’s influence.269 
D. External Federal Stakeholder Regulation 
External stakeholder regulation is a common method of regulating 
corporate enterprises. The federal government is reluctant to directly 
regulate the internal affairs of the corporation; that is, to alter existing 
power relationships among managers and shareholders. Instead, it prefers 
to use more external and less internally intrusive forms of regulation, such 
as disclosure, to prevent political backlash from powerful corporate 
constituencies.270 Beyond traditional corporate law, a panoply of other 
regulations affect corporations (e.g., OSHA,271 ERISA,272 the Clean Air 
Act,273 antitrust laws).274 This broader set of external regulations may 
 
268. Simmons, supra note 22, at 328. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 7261–66 (2006). 
269. Examples of incremental encroachment include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd Frank 
Act. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 10, 44–48 (2006); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1527 (2005); see also Donald C. Langevoort, The Social 
Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1821 (2007); Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to 
Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 733 
(2013). 
270. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of 
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 284–85, 290 
(1990). 
271. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78. 
272. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000). 
273. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q. 
274. See CLARK, supra note 26, at § 1.4 (distinguishing between traditional corporate law and other 
laws affecting corporations). 
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address stakeholder concerns to a greater degree than state corporate law 
and even federal securities statutes. The staunchest shareholder-primacy 
proponents acknowledge stakeholder concerns, yet they prefer redress 
through external regulations, not core corporate law.275 For example, 
federal chartering proponents have historically targeted corporate 
concentrations.276 They might wish to consider whether addressing 
corporate concentrations is better served within the context of specific 
regulatory laws; antitrust laws could directly address the anti-
concentration efforts. Decoupling or severing antitrust considerations 
from federal chartering proposals might also increase the likelihood of 
federal chartering’s adoption. 
E. State Social Enterprise Statutes 
In essence, recent proposals for federal chartering impose a mandatory 
benefit-corporation structure on large corporations that require directors 
to balance stakeholder interests.277 More than thirty-two states have 
already implemented benefit-corporation statutes.278 Recent research 
suggests that private investment in nascent Delaware public benefit 
corporations is significant.279 More experience and time is needed to 
discern whether these entities will attract enough capital to affect the 
governance practices of major corporations.280 Adopting a de facto federal 
benefit-corporation statute seems premature in the absence of more robust 
empirical data concerning litigation, investment, and incorporation.281 
F. Market Constraints 
In theory, market constraints could make corporate managers 
accountable to shareholder and stakeholder constituencies in the absence 
of federal chartering. Elite labor markets play a role.282 Executives 
worried about their reputation and prospects with present or future 
 
275. Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 134, at 94–96.  
276. See supra sections II.A–.C. 
277. See Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Smith, supra note 173; Nader 
& Green, supra note 173; Sanders, supra note 5.  
278. Why Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., https://benefitcorp.net/ policyma 
kers/why-pass-benefit-corporation-legislation [https://perma.cc/HS4K-5HRQ]; see also Dana 
Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—a Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV 591, 592 (2011) (describing growth in benefit corporation statutes).  
279. J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 581 (2016).  
280. Id. at 586.  
281. Id.  
282. Omari Scott Simmons, Forgotten Gatekeepers: Executive Search Firms and Corporate 
Governance, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 807, 821–22 (2019).  
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employers will tailor their conduct accordingly. Research shows that 
discharged executives have a difficult time securing comparable 
positions.283 Executive service contracts could serve as an additional 
restraint on managerial shirking and incentivize desirable conduct.284 The 
market for corporate control also affects managerial behavior.285 Here, the 
acquisition and disposal of controlling interests can serve as a check. 
Poorly run companies become subject to takeover, and incumbent 
management may be replaced.286 Capital markets influence managerial 
behavior and decision making. Access to financial capital is essential to 
achieving corporate goals and sustainability. Companies that need to raise 
funds via issuing shares or borrowing money will face scrutiny from 
investors if the company is poorly run.287 Product and service markets also 
constrain management. A company that is poorly run will not satisfy 
supply and demand or stimulate demand for its products and services. This 
could negatively impact perceptions of management.288 Reputational 
 
283. Rachel Feintzeig, When Chief Executives Become Job Seekers, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2014, 
12:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ceos-scramble-to-sell-themselves-when-looking-for-a-
new-job-1393979853 [https://perma.cc/6GT4-HRUW]; see also C. Edward Fee, Charles J. Hadlock 
& Joshua R. Pierce, New Evidence on Managerial Labor Markets: An Analysis of CEO Retreads, 48 
J. CORP. FIN. 428, 428–29 (2018) (finding the loss of a CEO position typically results in a 
“substantially inferior” subsequent CEO position).  
284. Hannah Levitt, Wells Fargo Ties Senior Executive Pay to Improving Diversity, BLOOMBERG 
L. (June 16, 2020, 6:18 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-16/wells-fargo-
ties-senior-executives-pay-to-improving-diversity [https://perma.cc/HT24-XFLX]; see also Seymour 
Burchman, A New Framework for Executive Compensation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Mar. 13, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/13/a-new-framework-for-
executive-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/7EJH-MBAY] (discussing realignment of executive pay 
with a company’s mission and purpose as a means to encourage more long-term and stakeholder 
focused decisions). 
285. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–
13 (1965). 
286. See id. at 113 (“The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient 
management, the more attractive the take-over becomes to those who believe that they can manage 
the company more efficiently.”).  
287. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 YALE L.J. 881, 889 (1995) (“This 
need for financing will expose the firm to the scrutiny of investors in the capital markets and of 
investment bankers and underwriters who serve as intermediaries between the firm and the capital 
markets.”). 
288. Munteanu Claudiu-Cătălin, Florea Dorian-Laurențiu & Pagalea Andreea, The Effects of 
Faulty or Potentially Harmful Products on Brand Reputation and Social Responsibility of Business, 
16 AMFITEATRU ECON. 58, 60 (2014) (linking “the effects of faulty and potentially harmful products 
on brand reputation specific constructs and key outcomes”); see also CNN Business, Volkswagen 
Emissions Scandal: A Timeline, YOUTUBE (June 28, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5
TvFY7xRDM [https://perma.cc/YLQ4-S8FR]; WXYZ-TV Detroit, GM Expected to Report 
Quarterly Loss Over Ignition Switch Recall, YOUTUBE (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=b64qr5oV-tc [https://perma.cc/R5DP-XDZT]; Doron Levin, GM Posts Huge Profit Drop 
Driven by Ignition Switch Crisis, FORTUNE (Apr. 24, 2014, 4:18 PM), https://fortune.com/2014/04/2
4/gm-posts-huge-profit-drop-driven-by-ignition-switch-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/V9CU-FN4Y].  
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concerns are especially acute for consumer-facing companies and brands. 
For example, a company’s response to social activism in the current 
business climate can threaten its reputation or provide an opportunity to 
enhance it. One observer describes this issue as follows: 
The broad reach and deep impact of social activism powered by 
new information technology means that businesses are frequently 
engaged in social issues whether they want to be or 
not. . . . [C]hanges in social expectations about corporate 
behavior have also altered corporate social activism. Many in 
society and within corporations now expect businesses and 
executives, particularly those at large public companies, to 
engage with the critical social issues of today.289 
The failure to account for complex reputational risks may destroy the 
long-term value of a company.290 A company under a cloud of litigation, 
investigations, and even social media outrage may suffer reputational 
damage with serious financial ramifications. 
These market-based constraints on managerial conduct, however, have 
their limits. An overreliance on market mechanisms is unlikely to 
adequately prevent managerial entrenchment, shirking, self-dealing, and 
greenwashing.291 A company’s market power may insulate poor 
management. The market for executive talent is not that robust and 
executives may not face sufficient reputational damage and loss of job 
prospects to tailor their behavior. Similarly, the market of corporate 
control may not serve as an adequate check on managerial misconduct. 
Takeovers are often expensive, cyclical, more likely to happen in good 
financial times, and possibly impacted by a range of entrenchment 
mechanisms. 
G. Self-Regulation 
Some observers argue that adopting a self-regulatory paradigm focused 
on long-term value while embracing stakeholder concerns will obviate the 
need for more intrusive legislation.292 The threat of a federal chartering 
 
289. Lin, supra note 210, at 1546.  
290. Id. at 1579–81. 
291. Ian Kanig, Note, Sustainable Capitalism Through the Benefit Corporation: Enforcing the 
Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect Non-Shareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 863, 896–
97 (2013); Reiser, supra note 278, at 611; Fairfax, supra note 238, at 1696–98.  
292. Solomon, supra note 64, at 596–97 (describing the basic functions of a regulatory regime); 
see also Martin Lipton, Wachtell Lipton Discusses Capitalism at an Inflection Point, CLS BLUE SKY 
BLOG (Feb. 20, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/02/20/wachtell-lipton-discusses-
capitalism-at-an-inflection-point/ [https://perma.cc/YQB7-QK7T] (“The New Paradigm is structured 
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statute laden with stakeholder-related measures may strengthen the appeal 
of self-regulation; a self-initiated response can forestall more “blunt” 
regulatory reforms and, at the same time, contribute to long-term 
corporate value and stakeholder welfare.293 
Like biological immune systems, the Corporate Immune System (CIS) 
includes a range of internal mechanisms to ward off threats. It reflects 
firms’ efforts to adapt to growing corporate complexity, threats to 
corporate value, and the reality of political compromise.294 Functionally, 
CIS performs an internal regulatory function that lowers monitoring costs 
for government regulators through such mechanisms as a monitoring 
board, compliance and risk management systems, compensation 
structures, an enhanced chief legal officer role, and ESG-sensitive 
governance.295 These internal measures complement external corporate 
governance strategies: markets, litigation, gatekeepers, and top-down 
public regulation.296 A well-established CIS, especially when 
complemented by engaged regulators and external gatekeepers, is an 
important feature of healthy corporate governance in large, publicly 
traded companies.297 In today’s socio-political context, companies are 
pragmatically adapting to investor and public demands to address 
stakeholders’ concerns. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS 
A global pandemic, socio-economic inequality, and broad public calls 
to address racial injustices are revealing weaknesses in U.S. economic and 
social arrangements. Public sentiment has shifted to support “stakeholder 
capitalism.”298 The confluence of these developments is forcing 
policymakers to rethink the overlapping roles that businesses, citizens, 
and the state will play in the future. These events, although significant, 
will not displace Delaware as a de facto national regulator. 
 
to obtain its benefits without the ill-fitting encumbrance of legislation and regulation. It is flexible 
and self-executing by corporations and investors adopting it and notifying each other that they have 
adopted it.”).  
293. See Lipton et al., supra note 140.   
294. See generally Simmons, supra note 65.  
295. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 110–16 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the benefits of 
internal firm regulation); Simmons, supra note 65, at 1133. 
296. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 295, at 128–29.  
297. Simmons, supra note 65, at 1133.  
298. Gavin Hinks, US Public Backs Shift to Stakeholder Capitalism Amid Covid-19, BD. AGENDA 
(June 9, 2020), https://boardagenda.com/2020/06/09/us-public-backs-shift-to-stakeholder-
capitalism-amid-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/C47P-CKSL].  
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A. The Shape of Future Corporate Governance Reform 
Within this contemporary context, Delaware will remain the “federal 
option” for corporate chartering. No federal corporate chartering law has 
been adopted despite centuries of debate. And contemporary federal 
chartering proposals along with efforts to enact an expansive federal 
corporate code likely face a similar fate. Some of the conditions under 
which previous proposals for federal corporate chartering came about, 
such as significant shareholder support, no longer exist given the 
enhanced voice of institutional investors. The relative absence of support 
from one of the key historical groups advocating for federal corporate 
chartering makes it less tenable from a political standpoint. In the future, 
incremental federal encroachment on Delaware law and external federal 
stakeholder regulation are likely regulatory responses.299 Self-regulation 
via accepted ESG frameworks will also play a prominent role in 
mollifying public fervor for more intrusive federal regulation. 
B. The Value of Federal Corporate Chartering Proposals 
Despite their lack of success, federal corporate chartering proposals 
provide value in important ways. 
1. Looking Beyond the Status Quo Toward Greater Hybridization in 
Regulatory Design 
Delaware’s effectiveness as a de facto agency, coupled with other 
available forms of corporate regulation, renders contemporary proposals 
for mandatory or even voluntary federal chartering premature and 
superfluous. Notwithstanding, the federal chartering debate prompts a 
more robust discussion of alternatives and possibilities beyond the status 
quo. It encourages deeper exploration of existing and potential reforms as 
well as their interplay. Contemporary federal corporate chartering 
proposals reflect a longstanding tension between the exercise of corporate 
power and broader stakeholder concerns. This tension underlies the 
important trend of hybridization in regulatory design as well as corporate 
practice to accommodate the interests of multiple corporate constituencies 
with diverse motives.300 Hybridization has been used in a variety of fields 
 
299. For a discussion of incremental federal encroachments and external federal stakeholder 
regulation see supra sections V.C–.D. An example of state stakeholder regulation is a recent 
California law requiring women be on the board of all publicly held companies. CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 301.3 (Deering 2020).  
300. ESG and public benefit corporations reflect this hybridization trend.  
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as a way to create proposals by blending competing theories.301 As a 
theoretical and practical matter, meeting the demands of diverse 
stakeholders requires an adaptive hybridized approach to governance 
issues. This is a type of evolution; the regulatory architecture is improved 
by grafting on the best features from an array of approaches. 
The contemporary ESG focus and proliferation of social enterprise 
statutes are an outgrowth of this trend toward hybridization. The 
emergence of impact investing and ESG frameworks, among the most 
significant developments in the past fifty years, requires a hybridized 
attention to both financial and social impacts. This landscape is pressuring 
federal, state, and firm self-regulatory regimes to accommodate broader 
stakeholder concerns.302 A new generation of investors prioritizes 
stakeholder impact.303 In response, companies are altering some of their 
internal governance practices. Recent events involving the COVID-19 
pandemic along with broader calls to address racial and economic 
injustice have accelerated demands for regulatory reform and greater self-
regulation. A broad, hybridized approach to corporate governance is 
demanded, one not limited to shareholder concerns but incorporating a 
range of stakeholder constituencies. As one observer acknowledges, “the 
current—and likely future—terrain of business and social activism 
suggests that a singular narrative centered exclusively on amoral profit-
seeking would be unsatisfactory for many corporate stakeholders, social 
activists, and policymakers.”304 Businesses “should be able to articulate 
their profit-seeking purposes in a comprehensive manner that better 
accounts for the social interests and norms expected . . . which in turn may 
actually lead to superior financial performance” and enhance their value 
for employees, consumers, and society at large.305 
 
301. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 349 (2004) (defining hybridization as “drawing 
together elements from rival schools of thought” in the context of creating new forms of governance); 
Lin, supra note 210, at 1579–80 (“By working on important issues that are at the forefront of society’s 
concerns, instead of focusing solely on profit, corporations could enhance their value to consumers, 
employees, recruits, and shareholders. Being socially responsible does not mean being financially 
irresponsible.”). 
302. Similarly, social enterprise statutes require a balancing of stakeholder interests. See Eccles & 
Klimenko, supra note 226.  
303. Dorff et al., supra note 243, at 27 (“In a recent international survey, some 87% of millennials 
said they thought that financial performance should not be the only measure of a company’s 
success.”).  
304. Lin, supra note 210, at 1597–98.  
305. Id. at 1598; id. at 1579–80 (“Being socially responsible does not mean being financially 
irresponsible.”). 
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2. Discrete and Severed Elements from Corporate Chartering 
Proposals Are Sometimes Adopted 
Elements of unsuccessful federal corporate chartering proposals have 
been proposed “à la carte” or recycled as part of more successful reform 
proposals (e.g., independent directors, enhanced disclosures, etc.). This 
phenomenon reveals the cyclical nature of corporate reform and that many 
contemporary reform proposals are not novel but often contain elements 
of previously unsuccessful reform efforts.306 In this sense, corporate 
chartering proposals might signal or foreshadow future reforms. 
3. Functioning as a Bargain Tool 
Finally, federal chartering proposals provide value as a bargaining tool 
where the threat of more intrusive federal regulation makes other reform 
methods more palatable to diverse corporate constituencies. They prompt 
legislators and corporate managers to coalesce around less intrusive, 
stakeholder-focused reforms. The threat of top-down regulation and more 
punitive sanctions may sometimes be necessary to discipline corporate 
actors, to force recalcitrant firms to obey established rules intended to 
provide systemic benefits to a broader range of market participants, and 
to push firms to address problems through internal self-governance.307 
CONCLUSION 
The laws from which U.S. corporations are created and acquire their 
legal characteristics are largely local. Yet modern corporations have a 
global scope and far-reaching impacts on multiple constituencies. 
Concentrated corporate power has profound economic, democratic, and 
social consequences. From this tension emerges the desire to subject 
modern corporations to federal law. Despite the historical and recent 
waves of federal chartering proposals, Delaware’s role as a de facto 
regulator will likely persist alongside incremental federal encroachment 
on the traditional scope of state corporate law. Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank provide the incremental, less disruptive, and politically feasible 
template for greater federalization of corporate governance. Despite two 
centuries of reoccurring federal corporate chartering proposals, these 
proposals have not become law. Similarly, contemporary corporate 
 
306.  See Simmons, supra note 2, at 219. See generally Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, 
Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 
AKRON L. REV. 1; Fairfax, supra note 238.  
307. Edward Rubin, The Regulatizing Process and the Boundaries of New Public Governance, 
2010 WIS. L. REV. 535, 553–55 (2010). 
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chartering proposals like the Warren and Sanders plans are likely to fail. 
They will, however, coincide with other successful types of corporate 
reform (e.g., antitrust, labor, climate, and tax reforms as well as political 
spending and climate disclosures). These recent chartering proposals and 
their context resurrect a seminal question: Can Delaware serve as an 
effective national regulator? Yes, with some caveats and qualifications, 
Delaware can continue to perform an important agency-like role in 
collaboration with federal regulators and regulated firms. 
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